

# Local court executes 2 in Afghanistan

## Hands of five persons to be amputated shortly

From Behroz Khan

PESHAWAR: Two young Afghans convicted of murders by a local Islamic Quzza Court, were publicly executed in Kunar, Afghanistan, Thursday.

The two accused, Gul Mohammad, 27 and Amanat Gul 23 were produced before the Quzza Court, headed by Qazi Mohammad Umar, in the presence of about 3,000 people assembled at a ground adjoined to the Asadabad air base. The Qazi displayed the verdict written in Persian and asked the two accused whether they were ready to surrender before the will of Allah. Not knowing what was written on the sheets, they raised their hands in approval to a verdict which was yet to be announced.

It was on early Thursday morning, that the people of Asadabad were informed through the public address system that the "Amarat-i-Islami" was going to execute the two accused at 11:00 am at the air base.

Alias Khan Mulla, the acting Governor of Kunar said only close relatives of the two accused had been informed about the execution of the two accused, belonging to Pich Dara and Badel Dara.

Before ordering the execution, the Qazi asked the heirs of the deceased whether they would accept Deyat (compensation), pardon the accused or would take revenge in accordance with the injunctions of Islam.

Gul Mohammad of Pich Dara was charged with killing one Jandali (55) and his (Gul Mohammad) wife Shahinama (12) for committing adultery. The accused could not produce four eye witnesses as required under the Islamic Jurisprudence to prove his case. Gul Mohammad was kept reciting verses from the Holy Quran throughout, the proceedings stood firm on his claims, saying "if there is any one from my village, he would support my assertion." To this Qazi retorted that the court had asked several people in his village and all of them had rejected his claim. The Qazi said that the deceased Jandali Khan had taken back a rifle from the accused stolen by the latter. The accused, who the Qazi felt could not face humiliation at the hands of his friends killed Jandali and fled to Lahore. Six months later he returned to his home to take his wife but on his refusal killed her on the spot.

The father of Shahinama, the Qazi further informed the audience, had advised his daughter not to marry the accused as the heirs of Jandali had threatened to take revenge from his family, if he allowed his daughter to go with the accused.

The other accused, Amanat Gul appeared calm hoping his father and uncle would show mercy. Amanat had been charged with killing his own uncle Naza Gul. He, raised his both hands, when the Qazi asked whether he submitted before the will of Allah.

When armed Mujahideen were taking him to the execution spot, he wailed and beseeched his uncle for forgiveness. "Aren't you my uncle, didn't I play in your lap" were his words lost on his uncle. "For God's sake forgive me" were his last words. Habib Jan, Amanat's uncle instead hurled abuses at his nephew and urged the Mujahideen to take him to the execution site. Both of them were shot dead with ~~with~~ <sup>by</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~killers~~ <sup>killers</sup> by the relatives of the killed persons.

The announcement of the execution of the two accused surprised many present there. They expected the two accused would be forgiven and the heirs would simply pardon or demand for compensation. School children from local religious institutions and orphanage, run by Arabs were present there in large number to witness the executions.

On one occasion, Gul Mohammad refused to be blind folded and put up a brave face. "Why should I

be blind folded, I shall look into his eyes, when he shoots at me" he said.

This is the 6th execution in Kunar since Amarat-e-Islam of late Moudin Jamal Rehman took control of the province in 1989. Qazi Umar informed that the hands of five persons accused of having been involved in theft case would shortly be amputated.

News (Pakistan) 10/31

## Afghans Picking Chief Under Rebel Threat

KABUL, Afghanistan, Dec. 29 (AP) — A national council met today to begin choosing the country's next president, but most rebel groups boycotted the meeting and threatened to resume fighting if the council went ahead with its work.

The rebel groups contend that the Government tampered with the selection of council members and bought them off to insure the re-election of the interim President, Burhanuddin Rabbani.

Battles and squabbling among Islamic rebel groups have torn Afghanistan since the guerrillas ousted the Soviet-backed President, Najibullah, in April after 14 years of civil war.

The Council for Resolution and Settlement — whose 1,400 delegates represent Afghanistan's 29 provinces, reli-

gious scholars, tribal elders and 1,000 commanders — gathered at the Interior Ministry to decide who will govern Afghanistan for the next 18 months.

President Rabbani, a 53-year-old Islamic scholar who took office in June, is considered the front-runner.

He has denied allegations that his Government handed out hundreds of thousands of dollars to buy the loyalty of council members.

Hezbollah, a coalition of Iranian-supported Shiite rebels, vowed to fight if Mr. Rabbani is re-elected. The rebel leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, expelled from the interim government for attacks that killed thousands of people in Kabul over the summer, threatened to take up arms again unless the council was called off.

NYT — 12/30

News (Pakistan) 10/29

## Riyadh out to woo Afghan rulers

From Rahimullah Yusufzai

PESHAWAR: By reopening its embassy in Kabul and naming a new ambassador, Saudi Arabia appears to have launched a major offensive to befriend Afghanistan's new Mujahideen rulers and to counter Iran's growing influence.

Gen Mohammad al-Aied, the Saudi envoy, is reported to have reached Kabul to take up his new assignment. He had left Peshawar by road on October 26, stopping near Kabul to meet Gulbaddin Hikmatyar.

The choice of Gen al-Aied to be Riyadh's first ambassador to Kabul after the installation of a Mujahideen government is interesting considering his military background.

The Saudis were one of the biggest beneficiaries of the Mujahideen providing as much money to them as that doled out by the United States. Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal played a vital role in this covert operation and in the process exerted a lot of influence on the Mujahideen leaders. In fact, Gen al-Aied used to

accompany the Prince on some of his frequent trips to Pakistan to oversee the Mujahideen war effort and to resolve their internal differences. Ironically, the Saudi embassy in Kabul was robbed on at least three occasions after the Mujahideen takeover. It was unbelievable considering Riyadh's committed backing for the Mujahideen during the past 14 years. The thieves came again and again, taking away almost everything from the closed Embassy premises without any fear of retribution.

One major factor which prompted the Saudis to reopen their Embassy in Kabul must have been the alarming rise in Iranian influence in Afghanistan. The Saudis had closed their Embassy as was done by the US and other Western countries in early 1983 when Soviet troops pulled out of Afghanistan and it was widely believed that the Najibullah government was about to fall. The Iranian Embassy, like Pakistan's, continued to operate in Kabul, thus providing Tehran a decisive edge over Riyadh. Iran also had a consulate in Herat and was planning

to open another one in Mazar-i-Sharif. The Saudis, lagging behind in the diplomatic race, were therefore constrained to act.

The Saudis were in the past accused of backing diehard Sunni fundamentalist Mujahideen groups, especially prof. Sayyaf's Ittehad-i-Islami. The Iranians, on the other hand, supported Shia parties like Hezbollah. This was the reason that observers noted during an earlier battle for Kabul that the Saudis and Iranians were fighting a proxy war in Afghanistan. The two Islamic states have in fact been battling for power and influences in many countries, notably in the Lebanon, Sudan and even in Pakistan. Anxious to build bridges with the new powerful actors, the Saudis have been trying to revive tenuous ties with Jamiat-i-Islami chief Prof Rabbani and his defence minister Ahmad Shah Masood, particularly to allay their worries that Riyadh was backing Hikmatyar in the ongoing struggle for power in Afghanistan.

# UN envoy warns Afghan leaders to stop infighting

By Altaf Yawar

ISLAMABAD, Dec. 27: Expressing serious concern over depressing developments in Afghanistan, Mr. Sotirios Mousouris, personal representative of United Nations Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan today gave a strong warning to the Afghan leadership to stop the ongoing infighting and improve the security situation in Kabul.

Addressing a press conference at his office here this afternoon he said that if the leaders of Afghanistan did not reach an early political consensus and advance the democratic process the international community would not be able to maintain its current level of humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people. International donors of humanitarian aid were currently focussing more on Somalia and Bosnia, he added.

According to Mousouris, if instability continued, the aid-donors would not be interested to come to the help of Afghan people in 1993. He said on a UN appeal the international community had last year given 180 million dollars relief and rehabilitation aid.

A similar appeal would be made shortly by the world body but he was not sure whether it would draw the same response.

This appeal, he said, would cover the period from January to September, he said but did not give any figure.

The Secretary-General's representative complained of difficulties which various United Nations' agencies were facing in extending relief assistance to various parts of Afghanistan, especially the food aid.

Frequent outbreak of hostilities hindered the distribution of this aid, he said and in this connection made a particular mention of the embattled city of Kabul. According to him so far only one per cent of food aid had reached the citizens of Kabul who were up against a harsh winter.

Answering a question, Mousouris said that deteriorated security situation in Kabul had forced the United Nations to withdraw its officials from Kabul. As

of today there were only three United Nations' officials present in Kabul, he said.

He said it was his earnest hope that the donor community would maintain in 1993 its interest in the welfare of Afghanistan, and that through the efforts of the Afghan leadership peaceful conditions would soon prevail. "I have no doubt that improved security would encourage donor countries to increase their contribution for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan", said Mr. Mousouris.

It was disappointing to note, he went on, that eight months after the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, political instability continued, affecting both the supply of humanitarian assistance and the launching of the much-needed reconstruction efforts.

"The plan to convene a Shoorah, which gave promise of progress towards political normalisation, is encountering serious difficulties and at the moment does not appear to command the necessary national consensus," said the senior UN official.

Mr. Mousou said he had been invited to attend a meeting of the Shoorah as an observer. He said he had sought some clarifications from the interim government of Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani in Kabul. These would be forwarded to UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali who would then decide about his attending the Shoorah, he added.

Asked if he would play any political role, including a mediatory role, during the Shoorah meeting, he said for the present such a possibility did not exist. His predecessor Mr. Benon Sevan used to play the role of an intermediary but that was a thing of the past. However, Mousouris said that he could play a political role only if the Afghan leadership requested for it or Secretary-General Ghali ordered him to do so. So far neither of these two possibilities had arisen, he added.

Giving figures of the number of Afghan refugees who have so far left Pakistan, Director of UNHCR in Pakistan, who was present on the occasion, told newsmen that

## New Afghan president to be elected on schedule

ISLAMABAD, Dec. 5: An official of the Islamic Government of Afghanistan has said that the new president of the country would be elected by Hal-o-Aqd Shoorah on the scheduled date, says Voice of Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan, (VIRA).

The Chairman of the Commission for Convening of Shoorah, Syed Noorullah Embad, said that the process of election of the President would be completed within next few days.

However, VIRA said that some observers of the Afghan affairs doubted the information of Shoorah on the scheduled date. They predict that the power was expected to be transferred to the leadership council and the new provincial government.

Meanwhile, The Deputy Minister of the Returnees Affairs, Mr. Noora Jan, in a meeting with Charge d'Affaires of the Iranian Embassy yesterday discussed matters pertaining to return of refugees from Iran to their homeland, says Radio Kabul.

In the meeting the Afghan Deputy Minister also referred to the problems faced by Afghan refugees in Iran and handed over a memorandum to the Iran Charge d'Affaires in this regard. The Charge d'Affaires said the matter would be referred to his country.

Meanwhile, a radio Teheran broadcast said that the chief of UNCIIR John Marris yesterday met Director-General of the Iranian Interior Ministry and apprised him about plan about repatriation of refugees. He said four offices of the UN High Commission have started functioning in the west of Afghanistan to monitor

and supervise the process of repatriation of refugees and reconstruction of Afghanistan.

According to Radio Kabul, the Khateebis and Imams in their Khutbas at Jamia Mosque of Kabul city, have urged Muslim women to observe purdah in accordance with Islamic laws --APP

PT 12/6

### HELP WANTED

Mehrnaz Saeed-Vafa, an Iranian filmmaker, is doing research on Afghans in exile in the US. She would like to network with Afghans who might be willing to participate in her project.

Anyone who is interested in assisting with this project - with stories, books, photos, books, suggestions, etc., can get in touch with her at 4339 N. Dayton St., Chicago, IL 60613.

(312) 975-1434

out of a total of 3.2 million refugees about 1.5 million had gone back. It was expected that one million more would return home during 1993, he said.

About the position of former Afghan President Najibullah, Mr. Mousouris said he was staying safely at UN premises in Kabul and hoped that his future would soon be decided.

He further said, 55,000 Tajik refugees had taken refuge in Afghanistan, who are being looked after by UNHCR.

PT 12/28

"The Pashtun's enmity is like a smouldering fire."

د پښتون بدى  
د سړى اور دى

## Afghan leaders meet tomorrow

Burhanuddin Rabbani, Pir Gailani, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi seen as like-minded group within Leadership Council

By Anwar Iqbal

ISLAMABAD: The nine senior leaders of Afghanistan are now scheduled to meet Saturday to elect a new President, Afghan sources said Thursday.

The leaders were to meet in Afghan capital Kabul Wednesday to find a new ruler for their war-ravaged country but could not do so because of serious differences.

President Burhanuddin Rabbani completed his 4-month tenure Tuesday and "he now has no legal basis to rule," said a spokesman for the Islamic Front party of his main rival Gulbadin Hekmatyar.

Afghan sources said six of the nine main leaders were now in Afghanistan and had agreed to participate in a leadership council meeting.

Two others were in Pakistan and were also willing to come. The 3rd is ill in London and therefore, can't come.

Three of the six—Rabbani, Pir Gailani and Sibghatullah Mojaddedi—are already in Kabul and are seen as a like-minded group within the council.

Two others—Hekmatyar and Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf—have refused to go to Kabul and want the council to meet outside the capital. They say they will not go to Kabul as long as the former communist militia and officials are there.

The two in Pakistan—Maulvi Yunus Khalis and Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi also supported this position and were willing to attend the council meeting if it was

held outside Kabul.

Two other members of the council are prominent Shi'ite leaders Ayatollah Mohsini and Ayatollah Murtazavi. Although so far they have given no public statement on this issue, they are with the government.

A spokesman for Hekmatyar's party said the dissident group waited for Burhanuddin Rabbani to come to Paghman, about 25 km west of Kabul Wednesday for the meeting. "We also waited Thursday but he never came," he said.

The dissident group, which now includes Hekmatyar, Sayyaf, Khalis and Mohammadi, says Rabbani's failure in stepping down as scheduled has created a political vacuum in Afghanistan.

On April 24 an All-Party meeting in Peshawar formed a legal framework to run Afghanistan after the fall of the Soviet-installed regime in Kabul.

The framework provided for two interim governments. The first, of Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, completed its tenure in June and the second one of Rabbani, completed it Tuesday.

Rabbani had proposed calling a Consultative Council of scholars, commanders, public representatives and Afghan expatriates to decide a future administrative set up after his term expired. But the leadership council, the top decision-making body comprising leaders of all important Mujahideen factions, has to approve the proposal.

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which the situation arising out of the expiry of the tenure of the interim government would be discussed besides electing new head of state till the formation of Shooro Hal-o-Aqd.

When asked as to why his party decided to abstain from the crucial meeting, he said that Council did not follow its principles. He said that the Council did not take the members into confidence while taking any decision.

He regretted that the Council recently granted membership to two members of Harkat-e-Islami and Hezb-e-Wahdat, without taking other members of the Council into confidence. He said, according to the principles of the Leadership Council, every decision had to be taken with consensus.

He said that the present government had failed to form the Shooro within its stipulated period. He was of the view that the Shooro could not be established within 20 days or for that matter in one month. He disclosed that still there was no Shooro in majority of tehsils, district and provinces of the country.

Haji Deen said no leader would agree to lead the government for a month or so, therefore, the Council would prefer Rabbani to continue as head of the state till the formation of the Shooro.

He denied that his party proposed the name of Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi of Harkat Inqilab-e-Islami as head of state till the formation of Shooro Hal-o-Aqd.

The Hezb leader said that the withdrawal of Dostum militia was continuing and added that a batch of 500 militiamen would leave Kabul today for Mazar-e-Sharif.

He estimated that the total strength of militia in Kabul was not more than 6,000 to 7,000.

News (Pakistan) 10/30

## Heavy fighting erupts in Kabul ahead of Council meeting

KABUL (ANA) — Heavy fighting broke out in western part of Kabul between the mujahideen of Hezb-i-Islami and Hezb-i-Wahdat party ahead of Leadership Council's scheduled meeting to be held today (Saturday).

The fighting mostly continued in Dash-e Barch and surrounding areas for about four hours.

Spokesman of Hezb-i-Wahdat, Abdul Ali Mazari stated that the clashes were flared by those elements who did not want peace in Kabul. He continued that under a pre-planned conspiracy the two parties were pushed into clash in order to prolong the tenure of President Prof. Rabbani which already expired on October 28.

On the other hand, HIA sources said that Shooro-i-Nazar of Ahmad Shah Masood and militia were responsible for the clash.

Immediately after the guns between Hezb-i-Wahdat and Hezb-i-Islami fell silent heavy fighting broke out between Harkat-i-Islami (Mohsini) and Hezb-i-Wahdat men on Friday. No details of losses on either side were available.

Another report said that high level changes were expected in the interim mujahideen government when the Leadership Council would be meeting today (Saturday), reports Afghan News Agency.

There are indications that another mujahideen leader would be made successor of Prof. Rabbani while the latter is expected to take over the post of prime minister. The whole Afghan cabinet is expected to be reshuffled and the defence ministry is expected to be headed by Harkat Inqilab-i-Islami of Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi.

All the top brass leadership of mujahideen are expected to be included in the new government. The tenure of the new government is believed to be two months and during this period Shooro Hal-o-Aqd would be established.

On the other hand, there are strong predictions that the defence minister, Ahmad Shah Masood, and his northern allies which comprise Gilam Jam militia and armed units of the then communist

regime would resist the new changes and in case Rabbani is replaced they would stage a coup against his successor. Ahmad Shah Masood and his allies have already made arrangements for the planned coup as very recently they brought 30,000 fighters to the Afghan capital from the north.

On the other hand there are manoeuvrings that the mujahideen parties including Jamiat-i-Islami of Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani are brought on one platform when the Leadership Council will meet.

However, the next two days are very crucial when the new leadership of the country is chosen by the Council through joint consensus.

APP adds: Hezb-i-Islami (Khalis) has decided not to participate in the Leadership Council meeting, scheduled for today (Saturday), here in Wazir Akbar Khan.

Naib amir of HI (K), Haji Deen Mohammad said that he was informed by his party chief Maulvi Yunus Khalis on wireless on Friday from Peshawar, not to participate in the Council's meeting in



Pir Gailani

# Opium and reconstruction

Beena Sarwar

**A** bumper opium crop has come to Afghanistan's rescue, as the country attempts to deal with an economy in ruins, continuing power struggles between mujahedin groups, a collapsed infrastructure and the return of 15,000 refugees a day.

Poppy-growing is one of the few sure ways of earning a living, and farmers are supported by arm-and-drug-smuggling networks built up with the silent patronage of foreign governments during the 14-year war against the former Moscow-backed regime in Kabul.

Both Pakistan and the US have been accused of encouraging the opium trade as a way of financing weapons purchases. The result is that with a harvest of 3,000 tons this year, Afghanistan has overtaken Myanmar (Burma) as the world's biggest producer. The crop will be worth US\$24 billion by the time it hits the streets of Washington and London.

Most profits go to the drug mafias that control the trade, but the US\$100 earned by farmers for a kilo of raw opium is much welcomed in these difficult times.

Commented one farmer: "If we harvest seven kilos of opium, we will be able to survive the win-

*Increasing numbers of farmers are expected to turn to opium as the country's economic crisis deepens: by growing opium, many farmers are simply doing what the development Pundits recommend — helping themselves.*

ter."

Abdul Wasi, aged 30, a recently repatriated farmer, told a reporter earlier this year: "I know it's against Islam, but I have to earn a living."

With farmers receiving US\$50.25 for a kilo of wheat in June compared with US\$30 for opium, 15 kilos of opium produced on a typical small plot would earn six times more than 750 kilo of wheat which could be grown on the same parcel of land.

The lardy poppy also requires less care and irrigation than wheat or onions and can be grown on rugged, unlevelled land.

The country's rudimentary agricultural infrastructure has broken down; most of the irrigation network is damaged and few paved roads are usable.

"If we don't have employment

or irrigation to grow other crops," ask farmers, "how can we survive?" Some Western relief agencies, however, are reluctant to repair war damaged irrigation canals: "Why help the Afghans sell more opium?" asked an aid worker.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees expects the five million refugees who fled the fighting to be repatriated by November 1993. Each returning family receives a \$132 grant, plus 300 kilos of wheat from the World Food Programme. The wheat lasts a family of seven about three months.

Many have nothing to return to, and farmers offered incentives by international agencies trying to cut poppy cultivation are often sceptical: they say promises of better irrigation and provision of

fertiliser and seeds have often been broken. The UN has been funding the construction of schools, clinics and roads in poppy-free areas, but has been unable to offset the need for cash — and fear of the drug barons.

15% of Afghan males between the ages of 18 and 35 in refugee camps take heroin. Many will take their habit home.

Addiction is increasing elsewhere in South Asia: neighbouring Pakistan has an estimated four million addicts.

Increasing numbers of farmers are expected to turn to opium as the country's economic crisis deepens: by growing opium, many farmers are simply doing what the development Pundits recommend — helping themselves.

Alternative crops and jobs will reduce poppy growing only if the financial rewards approach those of opium. But some Western governments are demanding a tightening up of anti-narcotics laws and a drop in poppy production as a precondition for financial help. Of the US\$180 million asked by the UN for reconstruction projects, only US\$20 million has been forthcoming.

In a country in which the UN says 2,000 schools and hospitals have been destroyed, together with 34% of towns and villages, and roads, villages and grazing lands are littered with 10 million mines, the real cost of rebuilding the country is estimated at between US\$6 and \$7 billion.

Courtesy: Panos

## Leadership Council to elect Rabbani's successor today

KABUL (APP) — Election of the new Afghan head of state following the expiry of the tenure of the present regime, will be held here today (Friday).

The meeting will be held in the Afghan capital most probably in the Paghman area where chief of Hezbe Islami Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and chief of Ittehad Islami Prof. Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf have their base camps.

According to informed sources, Hekmatyar had refused to come to Kabul to attend the meeting. However, he expressed his willingness to participate in the meeting provided it was held in Paghman area, some 25 kilometres off Kabul.

When contacted by phone, a spokesman of the Leadership Council, Ahmad said the decisive meeting of the council was scheduled for Saturday, October 31. However, he was also unaware of the time and venue of the propo-

sed meeting. It may be mentioned here that Leadership Council is being postponed for the last few days. The tenure of the present regime expired on October 28.

Former interim Afghan president, Prof. Mujaddidi and Jalaluddin Haqqani, minister for justice have already arrived in the city to participate in the meeting of the council. Complete peace and tranquility prevails in the Afghan capital since the ceasefire call initiated by the Pakistan government on August 29 last.

Shops, markets and bazars are open and people throng to these areas in large numbers right from early morning till evening. Life comes to standstill after 6 pm in the capital.

According to circles close to presidential palace, chief of Hezbe Islami, Hekmatyar, chief of Ittehad Islami, Prof. Sayyaf and chief of his own faction of Hezbe Islami Maulvi Younas Khalis suggested the name of Maulvi Nabi Moham-

madi, chief of Harkat-e-Inqilabi Islami for the presidentship till the formation of Shooro Hal-o-Aqd while Prof. Rabbani, Prof. Mujaddidi and Hezbe Wahdat proposed the name of Pir Syed Ahmad Gilani of National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA) for the highest slot of the country.

However, both Nabi Mohammad and Syed Ahmad Gilani refused to head the government for a period of one or two months. Their main plea for refusal is stated to be short term of the office of presidentship.

Political analysts in the Afghan capital are of the view that the formation of Shooro Hal-o-Aqd is not an easy job and it would take seven to eight months to complete. They were of the opinion that Prof. Rabbani should continue to work as the president of the country till the formation of the Shooro. "We should avoid creating vacuum in the present set up," they added



Mujaddidi calls for time

Frontier Post 11/4

Frontier Post 10/30

# Secret Memos Trace Kremlin's March to War

By Michael Dobbs

The Afghan tragedy is also a prime example of the perverted client-patron relationship that cost the Kremlin so dearly in its dealings with the Third World. Viewed from outside, it seemed as if the puppet masters in Moscow controlled all the strings. In practice, many of the strings were being pulled by the puppets. That may be one reason why the worldwide Communist revolution—billed as a

Положения в д.

Вопросы, требующие решения  
своей деятельности относятся

к Положению

"The entry of our troops into Afghanistan would outrage the international community, triggering a string of extremely negative consequences in many different areas," said Kosygin, according to the Kremlin's official minutes of the conversation, making it clear that he was authorized to speak on behalf of the Soviet leadership. "Our common enemies are just waiting for the moment when Soviet troops appear in Afghanistan. This will

give them the excuse they need to send armed bands into the country."

"If our troops went in, the situation in your country would not improve. On the contrary, it would get worse. Our troops would have to struggle not only with an external aggressor, but with a significant part of your own people. And the people would never forgive such things."

In the Kremlin transcript of these negotiations, Taraki comes across like a merchant in the Kabul market, using flattery and cajolery to extract as much as possible from the Kremlin. "We will never be as close to anyone else as we are to you. We are the pupils of Lenin," he assured his hosts.

Like many of the Soviet Union's Third World clients, Taraki had a simple but effective negotiating technique. As soon as the Soviet leaders agreed to one of his demands, he immediately came up with a new one. A condensed version of the conversation's transcript:

Ustinov: We will give you a dozen Mi-24 counterinsurgency helicopters.

Taraki: What about pilots? If we can't get them from you, we will be obliged to approach one of our other friends, perhaps Cuba or Vietnam.

Ustinov: We will send you additional military specialists and advisers. . . .

Kosygin: We have decided to give you 100,000 tons of grain

Taraki: We need at least 300,000 tons of grain.

Kosygin: Okay, we will buy another 200,000 tons of grain from the Americans and resell it to you.

Taraki: But we have no money.

Kosygin: We will think about extending additional credits to you.

Taraki: We also need a powerful radio station to spread our propaganda throughout the world.

Soviet leaders may have sensed that they were being taken for a ride. A report of a Politburo committee dated June 28, 1979, depicts Afghanistan as a backward, feudal country with incompetent, sectarian leadership. At the same time, however, the Kremlin felt an ideological compulsion to prop up any regime that described itself as "Marxist-Leninist." The doubts were swept aside.

"Moscow demanded more 'positive information,' since too much 'negative information' left the Politburo in a bad mood," recalled the KGB's deputy station chief in Kabul, Alexander Morozov, in an article for the Russian weekly *New Times* published earlier this year. "We learned how to fulfill this demand. 'Positive information' accounted for almost 95 percent of our reporting."

By the end of the summer, huge quantities of Soviet war material were being sent to Afghanistan. Soviet military personnel were pouring into the country.

Some 700 Soviet paratroopers, disguised as aircraft technicians, were dispatched to Kabul airport to defend a squadron of Soviet warplanes. Soviet "advisers" were attached to every Afghan military and security unit, down to the battalion level.

## A Change of Course

The situation in Afghanistan took a dramatic turn for the worse in September 1979 when Taraki was overthrown by his top aide, Amin. The Soviets had never trusted Amin, regarding him as a power-hungry politician of dubious ideological convictions. There were even rumors, never confirmed, that Amin might be on the payroll of the CIA.

According to Morozov's article, Amin's rise to power provoked an angry debate within the Soviet diplomatic community in Kabul. The ambassador, Alexander Puzanov, advised Moscow to accept the *fait accompli*. "Taraki was a weakling and a dawdler," Morozov quotes Puzanov as telling his colleagues after the coup. "Amin is strong, and we must do business with him and support him."

The KGB station, by contrast, believed that Amin's usurpation of power would lead to "harsh repressions and, as a reaction, the activation and consolidation of the opposition." "The situation can only be saved by the removal of Amin from power and the restoration of unity" in the ruling party, the KGB concluded, according to Morozov's account. That would probably require direct military intervention.

It was the KGB line that was accepted in Moscow. On Oct. 29, the Politburo committee on Afghanistan warned that Amin was attempting to purge the party and state of all potential opponents. It also expressed concern over signs that the new leader was seeking to pursue a "more balanced" foreign policy. Amin's expressions of loyalty toward the Soviet Union were "insincere," the report in the Politburo archives concluded.

The report was signed by Foreign Minister Gromyko, Defense Minister Ustinov, KGB chief Yuri Andropov and Boris Ponomarev, the Communist Party secretary in charge of relations with "fraternal parties." With Brezhnev virtually incapacitated by several strokes and Kosygin preoccupied with domestic affairs, this group appears to have taken the lead in shaping policy toward Afghanistan during the weeks leading up to the invasion.

In the meantime, elite KGB units were being infiltrated into Afghanistan under different guises. The Zee group, which reported to the foreign intelligence arm of the KGB, arrived in Kabul in early November, ostensibly to guard the Soviet Embassy. In early December, according to Politburo documents, the Politburo ordered a Soviet motorized infantry battalion to Kabul to "protect" Amin's residence.

The decision to invade Afghanistan was made at the special Politburo session chaired by Brezhnev on Dec. 12, 1979, according to Russian officials who have tried to reconstruct the chain of events. It was at that meeting that Chernenko wrote the note spelling out the Politburo's decision, which was recently found by Russian officials in the Politburo archives.

With the exception of Kosygin, who did not attend the Dec. 12 session and is believed to have opposed the decision to invade, all full Politburo members signed off on the "measures." Brezhnev insisted that each one take a stand individually. Mikhail Gorbachev, who was a nonvoting member of the Politburo at the time of the invasion, later claimed that he was not consulted.

## Storming the Palace

The Alpha anti-terrorist squad of the KGB was flown to Kabul on Dec. 23. Like other members of the group, Nikolai Berlev was told only that he was being sent on a "special mission" to Afghanistan and was given three hours to pack, according to a recent account quoting him in the Moscow newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda*.

On the morning of Dec. 27, with the invasion already underway, the Alpha squad commandos received their instructions: Storm the presidential palace. The palace was defended by about 300 guardsmen fanatically loyal to Amin and another 3,000 or so regular soldiers. The attackers included the Alpha squad, the Zee group and a regiment of Soviet paratroopers, perhaps 1,000 men in all, the *Komsomolskaya Pravda* account indicates.

As dusk fell, a column of Soviet armored personnel carriers moved up the narrow road leading to the palace under a hail of fire from Amin's guards. When they reached the palace, Berlev told the newspaper, he and his friends rushed up the stairway to the second floor where Amin had his office. Someone threw a grenade into the president's study. Dressed in an Adidas T-shirt and blue boxing shorts, Amin rushed out of the room with a gun in his hand and was instantly shot dead. The bodies of dead guardsmen lay all around him.



Hafizullah Amin

Cowering in the bottom of an armored car as the Soviet special forces attacked was Assadulo Sarvari, the former head of Taraki's security service. Known as "King Kong" by the population of Kabul, Sarvari earlier had taken refuge in the Soviet Embassy during an abortive plot against Amin. He had come to the palace to reclaim the revolution.


"Sarvari was frightened and completely broken," Berlev recalled to the Moscow newspaper. "When he was led upstairs and shown Amin's dead body, he felt as if someone had attached wings to his back. He cheered up almost at once."

Back in Moscow, meanwhile, the Kremlin was working on its cover story. It was a familiar one. Amin had betrayed the revolution. Socialism was in danger. "Healthy forces" in the Afghan Communist Party had appealed to the Soviet Union with a request for "military help."

On Dec. 27, the day Amin's palace was being stormed, the Politburo approved a secret circular to leading Communist officials explaining the decision to intervene. It accused Amin of unleashing massive repression against his political opponents. "Things were developing in such a way that the achievements of the revolution and the democratic, progressive regime were in danger of liquidation," the letter said.



**Mohammed Taraki**



**Leonid Brezhnev**



**Alexei Kosygin**

It was an article of faith for the Kremlin that the "forces of world history" were "irreversible." Once a country had moved into the socialist camp, there was no turning back. Otherwise the whole rickety structure of the Soviet empire might start to unravel.

Moscow announced that Amin had been replaced by Babrak Karmal, the leader of the outcast Parcham faction of the Afghan Communist Party. Sarvari, a Khalq faction member like Taraki and Amin, was appointed first deputy prime minister.

On Jan. 2, 1980, the Politburo formally authorized an increase in the size of the "limited" Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan to 50,000 men plus 2,000 KGB service personnel. It also decided to exile

the human rights campaigner Andrei Sakharov to the closed city of Gorki to silence his criticism of the invasion.

The dire consequences mentioned by Kosygin in his March 1979 conversation with Taraki—when he rejected the Afghan leader's call for direct military intervention—were quickly realized. The Soviet Union found itself isolated on the international stage. Soviet troops soon became bogged down in a brutal guerrilla war with the Afghan mujaheddin. It took the Kremlin a few months to slide into the morass of Afghanistan. It was to take almost a decade to get out.

WP

NOVEMBER 15, 1992

# Dramatic Politburo Meeting Led to End of War

## Gorbachev Pressed to Pull Out of Quagmire for Soviets During Secret 1986 Debate

Second of two articles

By Michael Dobbs  
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW—The most powerful men in the Soviet Union were gathered in the Kremlin for the traditional Thursday meeting of the ruling Politburo. The calendar on the wall read Nov. 13, 1986. After calling the session to order, Mikhail Gorbachev initiated a debate that changed the course of Soviet and world history.

"We have been fighting in Afghanistan for six years now. If we don't change approaches, we will be fighting there for another 20 or 30 years," said the general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, glancing at the Politburo members gathered around the long walnut table. "We must finish this process in the swiftest possible time."

According to the minutes of the Politburo session, until recently a closely held secret, Andrei Gromyko, one of the small group of Soviet leaders who made the decision to invade

Afghanistan in December 1979, agreed with Gorbachev. Not so long ago, he reminded his colleagues, the Politburo had decided to make

through Pakistan and Iran. The effort had proved fruitless.

"Today, our strategic goal is to end the war," said Gromyko, who served as Soviet foreign minister for nearly three decades. Acknowledging that the mountainous, almost medieval land on the Soviet Union's southern borders was not, after all, ripe for a socialist revolution, he said they should "end it in such a way that Afghanistan will be a neutral state."

The secret deliberations over Afghanistan in November 1986, revealed in newly declassified documents obtained from the Kremlin's archives, are likely to be viewed by future historians as a political and ideological turning point

of enormous importance. Up to that moment, Soviet leaders had clung to the notion that the forces of world history were moving inexorably in favor of socialism. They adopted the maxim of the Russian empress Catherine the Great—"That which stops growing starts to rot"—and dressed it up in Marxist-Leninist language. Once a country had joined the socialist camp, there was no turning back.

Now, suddenly, the Politburo was conceding that defections from the Soviet Bloc were possible. Revolutions could, after all, be reversed. The decision to get out of Afghanistan—even at the cost of abandoning the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul—was the first step along a road that was to lead to the loss of Nicaragua, Ethiopia and Eastern Europe, and, ultimately, to the collapse of the Soviet Union itself.

"The decision to leave Afghanistan was the first and most difficult step," acknowledged former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who headed the special Politburo commission on Afghanistan that was set up in November 1986. "Everything else flowed from that," he said in an interview this year.

Thanks to the declassification of the top-secret archives, it is now possible to show how Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and Gromyko persuaded other Politburo members to abandon the Afghan quagmire. Politburo minutes marked "Top Secret—Single Copy" show that the Soviet lead-



ership agreed in November 1986 on a two-year deadline for withdrawing from Afghanistan. Ultimately, the deadline was missed by three months: The last Soviet combat soldier crossed the border on Feb. 15, 1989.

The documents suggest that the supply of high-tech American weaponry to the mujaheddin played a key factor in the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. At the time, some U.S. officials feared that the Reagan administration's decision to step up support for the mujaheddin in 1985 might provoke the Soviets into aggressive retaliation, such as cross-border raids into Pakistan. In fact, there is evidence it helped convince the Kremlin that the war was unwinnable.

## "Miracles Do Not Happen"

When the Politburo first committed 50,000 troops to Afghanistan in December 1979, the mood among Soviet leaders was relentlessly optimistic. Doubts about the extent of popular support for the "progressive" regime in Kabul and the unfavorable nature of the terrain were brushed aside. In a secret message to senior party officials justifying the invasion, the Politburo acknowledged that there were "waverers" and "doubters" but insisted they would be proved wrong.

In October 1980, just as Soviet military units were getting bogged down in their guerrilla war with the mujaheddin, the head of Soviet foreign intelligence decided to visit Kabul to assess the situation for himself. Local KGB officials were skeptical about the chances of a quick victory, but Vladimir Kryuchkov preferred to listen to the upbeat assessments of Afghan politicians and senior Soviet diplomats.

"The spring and summer of 1981 will be decisive for the final and complete defeat of the forces of the counterrevolution," predicted Kryuchkov in a cable to Moscow, according to a recent account in the Moscow weekly New Times by the former deputy KGB resident in Kabul, Alexander Morozov. Kryuchkov's cable set the tone for all official reporting.

By the time Yuri Andropov succeeded Leonid Brezhnev as Soviet leader in late 1982, it was clear to everybody that there would be no quick victory over the mujaheddin. But Andropov, a former KGB chief accustomed to fighting long campaigns against counterrevolutionaries, had no intention of conceding defeat, the Politburo minutes show.

"What do you expect?" Andropov exploded, after Gromyko talked about the need for a "political agreement" with Pakistan to curb the flow of arms across the border. "The main question here is not the position of Pakistan. Our main opponent

here is American imperialism, which understands full well that it has lost its position in this particular corner of the international arena. That is why we cannot make any concessions."

For Andropov, the model for the war against the Afghan mujaheddin was the brutal campaign to establish Soviet rule in Central Asia following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. As Andropov—one of the main instigators of armed intervention in Afghanistan—reminded his Politburo colleagues, it took almost the entire Red Army 15 years to subdue the rebellious khanates in the Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan. Final victory over the Muslim rebels, called *basmachi*, was not achieved until the mid-1930s.

"Miracles do not happen," insisted Andropov in the minutes of a Politburo session on March 10, 1983. "We may sometimes get angry at the Afghan [government], and accuse them of inconsistency and delay. But let us remember our own struggle with the *basmachi* . . . That is why in our relations with Afghanistan, we need to be both demanding and understanding."

## A New Strategy

As far as the Soviet propaganda machine was concerned, the war in Afghanistan did not officially exist until mid-1985. The bodies of Soviet soldiers killed in action were bought home in anonymous wooden coffins and buried secretly. Their relatives were told only that they had fulfilled their "internationalist duty."

When Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, he decided to drop the pretense that Soviet troops were not involved in combat operations in Afghanistan. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet young men already had witnessed the horrors of the anti-mujaheddin campaign. Officers serving in desolate mountain outposts were sick of risking their lives in a non-war. The West, of course, knew perfectly well what was going on—and broadcast reports of the fighting back into the Soviet Union via radio stations such as Radio Liberty and the Voice of America.

The first shoots of *glasnost*, as Gorbachev's policy of increased openness was called, were tender indeed. On July 22, 1985, a document issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party instructed newspapers and television to begin limited coverage of the Afghan war. For the most part, coverage was to be restricted to such events as visits to Kabul by Soviet dignitaries, medal ceremonies for Soviet troops—"without referring to their concrete military activity"—and humanitarian assistance to the Afghan population. The media also were authorized to show "individual cases of Soviet soldiers

being wounded or killed during the course of their duties"—but such reports were rationed to "no more than one a month," the document says.

By October 1985, the Politburo had worked out a new line on Afghanistan. The aim, according to Politburo minutes, was to "speed up the withdrawal" of Soviet troops while assuring the survival of a "friendly" regime in Kabul. A two-pronged policy was adopted: a more vigorous prosecution of the war in the short term, combined with an attempt to broaden the political base of the Afghan government. The immediate military goal was the closing of the border with Pakistan to prevent arms supplies from reaching the mujaheddin.

The new military strategy was implemented by Gen. Mikhail Zaitsev, a World War II combat officer and former commander of Soviet troops in East Germany. Several thousand highly trained *spetsnaz*, or "special assignment," forces were transferred to Afghanistan to serve under his command. Using sophisticated battlefield communications equipment, their task was to locate the mujaheddin and destroy them from Mi-24 helicopters.

For a time, the new strategy seemed to be working. But the Kremlin's decision to escalate the war led to a counter-escalation decision in Washington. The Reagan administration decided to increase military supplies to the rebels and provide them with the means to shoot down the helicopter gunships. According to former U.S. and Pakistani officials, the first heat-seeking Stinger missiles arrived in Pakistan in June 1986, complete with an electronic simulator for training the mujaheddin.

By November 1986, the Politburo had revised its earlier assessment that the war was winnable. "The situation is worse today than it was six months ago," moaned Gromyko, according to the minutes. "We must be much more active in searching for a political solution. Our people will breathe a sigh of relief if we undertake steps in this direction."

"There is not a single piece of land [in Afghanistan] that the Soviet soldier has not conquered. Despite this, a large chunk of territory is in the hands of the rebels," complained Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, the armed forces chief of staff, trying to shove the blame for the fiasco onto the politicians. "We control Kabul and the provincial centers," he continued, according to the minutes, "but we have been unable to establish authority over the seized territory. We have lost the struggle for the Afghan people."

Although the Politburo did not directly address the question of U.S. support for the mujaheddin at this session, Akhromeyev effectively acknowledged that the Western strategy had paid off. "We have deployed 50,000 Soviet soldiers to seal



the border, but they are unable to close all channels through which arms are being smuggled across the border," he told the Politburo.

## Najibullah Aids Withdrawal

By the middle of 1986, a new political star had risen in Kabul in the form of a thuggish-looking Afghan Communist by the name of Najibullah. Until then, the Soviets had had little choice but to support Babrak Karmal, the waffling ideologue they had installed in power in Kabul in December 1979 following the murder of president Hafizullah Amin. A former secret policeman and security chief, Najibullah was regarded by the Soviets as more flexible and energetic than Karmal.

"Karmal isn't straight with us," the Politburo minutes show Gorbachev complaining. "The main reason that there has been no national consolidation so far is that Comrade Karmal is hoping to continue sitting in Kabul with our help."

Najibullah pushed Karmal aside as leader of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in May, 1986. (Karmal

stayed on as titular president until the end of November.) A few months later, Najibullah proposed a set of measures that would in effect "Afghanize" the war by training Afghan soldiers to bear the brunt of the fighting. "National reconciliation"—including hints about a possible role for the exiled Afghan king and overtures to Islamic parties—became the official policy of the new regime.

It is unclear to what extent Najibullah was primed by Gorbachev's emissaries to come up with a plan that would permit the Kremlin to set a timetable for withdrawal. In any event, he clearly sensed which way the political winds were blowing in Moscow—and used Soviet support to settle accounts with his rivals in Afghanistan. The pro-Gorbachev faction in the Politburo seized upon his proposals as a plan to end the war.

"We now understand the results of ill-thought-out policies in the past," said Shevardnadze, who had succeeded Gromyko as foreign minister in July 1985, Politburo minutes show. "Najibullah has

joined the leadership. He needs our practical support, otherwise we will bear the political consequences."

"Karmal must be gotten rid of," agreed Anatoly Dobrynin, the former ambassador to Washington then serving as Central Committee secretary for international relations. Dobrynin continued, according to the minutes: "But we must remember that, as far as national reconciliation is concerned, not a single member of the Afghan politburo supports Najibullah."

With the exception of Gromyko, none of the Soviet leaders who made the original decision to invade Afghanistan were still in the Politburo in November 1986. They had all died—or been pushed out of power. Gromyko had been transformed into a loyal supporter of Gorbachev, at least on the Afghanistan question. The only note of dissent came from Viktor Chebrikov, the KGB chief. He supported the goal of withdrawal but implied that more vigorous measures might have won the war.

"Andrei Andreievich [Gromyko] is partly right when he talks about the difficulties

Сов.обсуждено  
Дел. единогласно  
(Результат решения)

ЗАСЕДАНИЕ ПОЛИТБЮРО ЦК КПСС  
13 ноября 1986 года

Председательствовал тов. ГОРБАЧЕВ Н.С.

Присутствовали чл.т. Воронников В.И., Громико А.А., Зайков И.И.,  
Рижков И.И., Славенко М.С., Чебриков В.И.,  
Шеварднадзе Э.А., Деметев П.И., Долгий В.И.,  
Бакун В.И., Талкин И.В., Бутченко А.П.,  
Добрынин А.Ф., Заменин И.В., Назаров В.А.,  
Никонов В.П., Гаврилов Г.П., Катанцев К.

Пункты повестки дня по вопросам прав

10. О РАЙОННЫХ МЕРОПРИЯТИЯХ ПО АФГАНИСТАНУ

11. О ЗАКОНЕ


ГОРБАЧЕВ. Все товарищи ознакомлены с запиской чл.т. Чебрикова В.И., Шеварднадзе Э.А., Соколова С.И. и Добрынина А.Ф. Члены Политбюро. Да, ознакомлены.

ГОРБАЧЕВ. Тогда давайте обменяемся мнениями. У меня такая интуиция, что мы не должны терять времени. Надою кидаться в надею поддержке. Он объективно оценивает ситуацию, понимает сложность стоящих проблем. Он ставит неаполитическую задачу активизации действий, направленных на национальное примирение, укрепление союза с крестьянством и консолидацию политического руководства партии и страны.



Mikhail Gorbachev

"If we don't change approaches, we will be fighting... for another 20 or 30 years."



Eduard Shevardnadze

"The decision to leave Afghanistan was the first and most difficult step. Everything else flowed from that."



Andrei Gromyko

"Today, our strategic goal is to end the war. End it in such a way that Afghanistan will be a neutral state."



Yuri Andropov

"Our main opponent here is American imperialism... That is why we cannot make any concessions."

The minutes of the Nov. 13, 1986, Politburo meeting, above, contain a "secret" designation in the upper right corner, a list of those attending the meeting below the date and, at No. 10, the introduction of the topic of Afghanistan, followed by discussion.

of closing the frontiers, due to geographic and other conditions. But the lack of success in sealing the border is also due to the fact that not everything was done that could have been done," he said, according to the minutes.

## Billions for Aid

By Western calculations, the Kremlin spent about \$5 billion a year waging war in Afghanistan. By Moscow's own admission, more than 15,000 Soviet troops were killed during the 10-year war. Even after the military withdrawal was complete, the Soviet Union was still required to spend billions of dollars propping up the Najibullah regime.

Anxious to prevent a general collapse, Moscow supplied 54 military airplanes, 380 tanks, 865 armored personnel carriers, 680 antiaircraft guns, 150 R-17 rocket launchers and thousands of tons of fuel to the Afghan government in 1990 alone. The population of Kabul consumed some 15,000 tons of Soviet grain every month. Assistance to the Kabul regime included such items as building materials for president Amin's residence, a lavishly equipped Institute of Social Sciences and annual cash injections for the Afghan Communist Party.

To keep the supply lines open, Politburo documents show, the Kremlin gave serious consideration to sending 12,000 or so troops back into Afghanistan after the official withdrawal date of Feb. 15, 1989, to guard the Salang Highway that links Kabul to the Soviet border. In the end, they relied on an airlift.

It is difficult to calculate how much the Soviet Union spent on Afghanistan before or after 1989, as the cost was divided among many different budgets. But it is clear that it represented a significant drain

on the Kremlin's finances at a time when the Soviet Union was facing general economic collapse.

The abortive Communist coup of August 1991 paved the way for a cutoff in Soviet military supplies to Kabul beginning Jan. 1, 1992. By mid-April, the Najibullah regime had been driven from power by the mujaheddin. The sacrifices of a generation of young Soviet conscripts, who never understood why they were being sent to Afghanistan in the first place, had been in vain.

THE WASHINGTON POST

NOVEMBER 16, 1992



# The Opening of the Politburo's Archives

## *Closely Guarded Minutes Made Public, but Access Still Isn't Easy*

MOSCOW—Until a few months ago, few people outside the circle of former Soviet Communist Party leaders even knew of the existence of what is likely to prove an immensely valuable historical source: the verbatim minutes of the Politburo.

For the better part of seven decades, the Politburo was the only Soviet political institution where anything approaching free debate took place. Closeted in the Kremlin for their weekly Thursday meetings, the dozen or so Politburo members discussed the state of the world with a candor and frankness that would have been completely out of place in the rubber-stamp Soviet parliament or even the Central Committee, the party's top policy-making body.

Like the most secret Kremlin documents, the Politburo minutes were kept in one copy only. The note-taker was usually a senior aide to the general secretary of the Communist Party. Only the general secretary and his most trusted associates were allowed access to the minutes, which were kept in the "special archive." Politburo resolutions were given a somewhat wider circulation—in several dozen copies.

Some Politburo records have so far been declassified, to be used as evidence in Constitutional Court proceedings on the legality of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's decisions to ban the Communist Party. Some of these records—carefully

screened for any material that could possibly embarrass present-day Russian leaders—have been transferred to the Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents.

Obtaining access to the declassified Politburo records is not easy. In theory, they should be freely available. In practice, distribution is tightly controlled. According to Russian journalists who have taken an interest in the subject, the records are frequently used for political purposes. Many of the documents that have been released show former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev in a bad light. On occasion, documents are sold to the highest bidder or given to a foreign government.

The documents quoted here represent only a small fraction of the voluminous Kremlin files on Afghanistan, but cover some of the turning points in the war. Some have already been published in the Soviet press. The documents on the decision to invade were made available free of charge by Yeltsin's representatives in the Constitutional Court. The minutes of Afghan President Mohammed Taraki's conversations with Soviet leaders in March 1979 and the Politburo sessions of March 1983 and March 1986 were made available by the Contemporary Documents Center for a fee of \$400.

— Michael Dobbs

From the Editor:

Another year - time for most of you to renew your subscriptions. If an orange notice is enclosed with this issue, you owe us money. As subscriptions are our only source of revenue, we hope you will want to renew. The FORUM is strictly a volunteer operation; we do it for love, not money!

Much of this issue is devoted to a tale of two Shooras - which brings us to our annual disclaimer: We publish what has been said & written (using the spelling which appeared in the original source) about Afghanistan & the Afghans from as many sources as come to our attention. To believe or not to believe, we leave to you.

For what it's worth, we've heard, but not seen, reports that Pakistan has asked all Afghans & NGOs to leave the country by the end of this month, although the deadline for some NGOs may be extended. How this affects refugees is unclear.

Two shortages in this issue: the Kabul Times is not getting through; why, we don't know. And we received no new cartoons, so we recycled some old ones.

For those who ordered Occasional Paper #31, Amanullah: The Hard Case of Reform in Afghanistan, by Paul Overby with your last year's subscription, your copy is enclosed with this issue. If you didn't order it & want a copy, send us \$8 & we'll send it to you. (To what your appetite, an article related to the subject appears on p. 34.)

We remain indebted to all of you who send us information. You are the lifeline of this publication. Please keep those clippings coming. The deadline for the next issue is March 1.

## EVENTS

The 45th Annual Meeting of the Association For Asian Studies will take place at the Westin Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles from March 25-28.

The American Numismatic Society's annual "Seminar in Numismatics" will be held at the Society's headquarters in New York from 6/15 to 8/14. Proposals, due by 3/1, may be in any field as long as numismatic evidence is one of the bases for conclusions drawn. Each applicant accepted will receive a \$2,000 grant. The ANS also has other fellowships. For further information, write the ANS, Broadway @ 155th Street, New York, NY-10032.

The 4th Women in Asia Conference will take place at Melbourne Univ. in Australia from October 1-3. Suggestions for panels should be sent to the organizing committee, % Center for SE Asian Studies, Monash Univ., Clayton 3168, Australia, by 3/31.



Still going....



*Turkman Felt Design.*

# Who'll Stop the THE NEXT

"Yugoslavia"—a much bigger one—threatens to erupt in the former Soviet states bordering Iran, Afghanistan, and China. In Central Asia, ethnic, religious, and territorial tensions are growing. If not resolved, they could exceed the rivalries that have plunged the peoples of Yugoslavia into a bloody civil war. Europe and the US can still take diplomatic and economic steps to forestall an explosion in these lands that were jerry-built by Stalin's planners for economic exploitation and that now have been suddenly set free by the demise of the USSR. But Western leaders have their hands full. Few in their foreign ministries are paying close attention.

Not many surrounding countries are in position to intervene in Central Asia, even to the degree that the international community has in Yugoslavia, to help create a new equilibrium and civil peace.

Why should outside powers—already stretched by difficult peacekeeping in the Mideast, Yugoslavia, Somalia, South Africa, and Cambodia—care about this landlocked region in the heart of the Eurasian continent?

There are positive and negative reasons. First—and most easily grasped—parts of the region contain huge gas and oil reserves. And the industrial democracies will need new sources in the next century as old sources shrink. If you extend a line north and east from the greatest oil pool on earth (Saudi Arabia-Kuwait-Iran-Iraq) through the Caspian Sea into the heartland of the Islamic republics, you encounter other great petroleum reserves. Among the three Islamic nations vying for influence in the region, two—Saudi Arabia and Iran—are OPEC powers. (The third is NATO ally Turkey.) This leads some planners to worry about a potential Islamic oil colossus if the Arab and Persian rivals should ever make common cause.

Second, nuclear weapons are still deployed in part of the region (Kazakhstan).

Third, the region may help to decide whether a more modern, confident, globally cooperative version of Islam or a fundamentalist, chauvinist version gains influence in the world.

## A KEY

figure in the future of these three matters, as we shall see in a moment, is a powerful warlord from the war against Moscow's control of Afghanistan: Ahmed Shah Massoud. The Afghan

By Boris Rumer and Eugene Rumer

WORLD MONITOR NOVEMBER 1992

war, Western leaders would do well to remember, provided the most important early blow in the cracking of the Soviet empire. World attention has moved on now to other matters. But Massoud may pull it back as he starts to make his mark on a larger strategic canvas.

The five new independent states that make up this region still seem exotic and irrelevant to many Western eyes. Their names—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan—conjure up half-remembered history lessons starring Genghis Khan, Tamburlaine, and Alexander the Great. Their strategic and economic importance are recognized more by neighboring powers vying for influence than by Western planners. As already noted, these rivals are:

**TURKEY**, which has centuries-old ethnic, linguistic, and cultural links to the peoples of Central Asia and would like to establish itself as the preeminent political and economic power in the region. The Turkish government envisions a "Turkish Common Market" and is already planning to facilitate free travel and business activity by introducing one single identification document in the Central Asian countries.

**IRAN**, which has close ethnic, language, and cultural ties to Tajikistan and seeks to expand the presence of its version of Islam in the region. It is competing with Turkey for political influence and economic opportunities.

**SAUDI ARABIA**, which, according to local Central Asian sources, is spending large sums of money for Islamic religious and educational activities. It has been offering Central Asian young people fellowships for study in Muslim countries and sponsoring traditional pilgrimages to Mecca for local Muslims who cannot afford it otherwise. Considerations of power balance in the Persian Gulf practically mandate Saudi involvement in Central Asia to counter possible Iranian advances in an area that could become a strategic rear to the Gulf, as well as in the Islamic community at large.

Prospects of change for good or ill are illustrated by Turkmenistan, where many would like to think of their country as the "second Kuwait" in the making. It is potentially the wealthiest state in the region, thanks to large deposits of natural gas. Independence gave Turkmenistan the ability to dispose of such resources at its own discretion.

Nearby Tajikistan remains poor, indeed the poorest in the Commonwealth of Independent States and least stable in Central Asia. It is the fuse that could set off the regional explosion. Internal strife, which most recently led to the resignation in September (by some accounts literally at gunpoint) of President Rakhmon Nabiyev has resulted in a power vacuum not likely to be filled by any of the warring factions in Tajikistan.

Threats to regional stability emanate not only from Tajikistan's domestic turmoil, but from the presence of a large Tajik population across a very porous border with Afghanistan. One possible scenario being discussed, and feared, in all of Central Asia entails unification of all Tajiks in a greater Tajikistan under the leadership of the man talked about in Dushanbe, Tajikistan's capital, as the greatest Tajik military commander in this millennium. He is the previously mentioned Ahmed Shah Massoud, the powerful warlord and leader of minority Tajiks in Afghanistan.

Given the growing vacuum of power in Tajikistan—and the lack of a common ideological platform to reverse the fracturing of society—it may well take an outside political personality, such as Massoud, to bring a degree of stability to Tajikistan. But such stabilization would be short-lived and, were it to occur along with the rise of a Tajik state reuniting ethnic kin from the two sides of the border, would come at the terrible price of regional destabilization, for it would likely split Afghanistan and upset the fragile equilibrium in Uzbekistan with its own sizeable Tajik minority.

The Tajiks are the fastest-growing ethnic group in Central Asia and in the entire former Soviet Union. Their country is a patchwork quilt of regional, ethnic, and tribal fiefdoms where rivalries, suspicions, and territorial claims do not stop at the state border. Tajiks have long complained about the arbitrary and unfair borders drawn by Moscow in the 1920s, which gave Uzbekistan most of the fertile valleys (along with millions of Tajik subjects) and

BORIS RUMER ("Beating Swords into—Refrigerators?" WM, January) is a fellow at Harvard University's Russian Research Center. EUGENE RUMER is an analyst at the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, California. They specialize in regional developments in the former Soviet Union and have recently returned from Central Asia.

left Tajikistan with 90% of its territory consisting of mountains.

The logic and dynamics of internal rivalries in Tajikistan may appear incomprehensible to an outside observer. But the course of events there appears to be the prototype nightmare scenario that may haunt more than one Central Asian leader. Ethnic, religious, regional, and clan divisions have combined to pose a threat of geopolitical eruption that could upset the fragile peace in all of Central Asia.

## THE FALL

of the Moscow-backed Najibulla government in Afghanistan earlier this year crystallized the attention of Central Asian leaders. Much has been written about factional politics and rivalries in the coalition that has succeeded in ridding the country of the last vestiges of Soviet occupation only to turn on each other. One thing is becoming increasingly clear: The dividing line between the internal politics of Afghanistan and their spillover across the former Soviet border may soon disappear. The shifting fortunes of coalition warfare in Afghanistan are becoming closely tied to the politics of ex-Soviet Central Asia.

The connection is two-way. For the newly victorious ethnic warlords of Afghanistan, like Massoud, the leader of Afghanistan's Tajiks, the struggle for power in the battered Afghan capital, Kabul, is only beginning. The Tajiks' kin across the crumbling Soviet border in Tajikistan represent an important strategic rear in the struggle against the traditionally dominant Pashtun majority in Afghanistan.

Unification of Tajiks from the two sides of the former Soviet-Afghan border—an idea that has been raised on both sides—would, needless to say, alter the ethnic and power balances in Afghanistan. This, in turn, raises the specter of a partitioning of Afghanistan and mobilization of Pashtuns. And that would be a development that could not be ignored by Pakistan in the light of its own Pashtun population. Renewed pressure for a separate Pashtun state would threaten Pakistan's territorial integrity.

Tribal and regional violence in Tajikistan has generated a strong demand for weapons, which the local black market has not been able to satisfy through theft and illegal sales from Soviet Army warehouses. Border crossings by Tajiks from Tajikistan into Afghanistan in search of weapons have become commonplace. Many residents of Tajikistan, fearing for their safety, see personal weapons as their only protection against the threat of attack from

neighboring villages or rival gangs.

According to one estimate, during the first three weeks of July smugglers brought into Tajikistan 5,000 AK-47 assault rifles, scores of grenade launchers, anti-tank rifles, hand grenades, and various kinds of ammunition. It is not unreasonable to assume that these weapons, available in abundance in Afghanistan, are being supplied by local militias at cut-rate prices and possibly free of charge, creating an important constituency north of the border.

And "brotherly help" from Afghan Tajiks does not end with supplying weapons and ammunition. According to information supplied by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) military authorities in Central Asia, camps have been set up in Afghanistan for training of guerrillas, referred to there as "brother mujahideen from Tajikistan."

Many in Central Asia are convinced that the "Afghan-Tajik" connection does not begin in Afghanistan. Rather, they maintain, it originates in Iran, whose money, people, and religious and political influence are feared more than those of any other external source and are seen in the shadow of every mosque and behind every outburst of Islamic political activism in Central Asia.

Although most, if not all, of these suspicions have yet to be borne out, Tajikistan does represent a target of opportunity for Iran because of linguistic and cultural closeness. Tajikistan is the only country in Central Asia where the official state language does not belong to the Turkic group. Tajik is a close relative of Farsi, the national language of Iran.

The spillover of Afghan politics into Central Asia is undoubtedly a cause of major concern for all leaders in the region. The prospect of a greater Tajikistan would be enough to endanger the shaky political and territorial status quo. It would generate political momentum, intellectual rationale, and conceivably even precedent for further territorial revisions in the region. It would also be a likely catalyst for penetration of politically active fundamentalist Islam into the region, contributing to instability there along with other possible developments.

Nobody understands and fears such a prospect more than Uzbek President Islam Karimov. His country, with its sizable Tajik enclave and territory still claimed by many in Tajikistan, would be most vulnerable to revisionist demands from a future greater Tajikistan.

Relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have deteriorated steadily. Uzbek refugees have been fleeing violence in Tajikistan. President Karimov has resorted to increasingly tough measures

against what he apparently perceives as the Tajik "fifth column" in Uzbekistan. In mid-July Tajik-language schools in Samarkand were closed. Rail traffic from Tajikistan has been tightly controlled and Tajik passengers traveling to Uzbekistan have been ordered off the trains at the border.

## EVENTS IN

Tajikistan (alleged to have been precipitated by help from Afghanistan) clearly haunt President Karimov. Recently, he accused the opposition of taking the country along the "Tajik path" and warned about the threat of Islamic fundamentalism emanating from Tajikistan. Karimov swore that he would not stop at anything to maintain stability in the country and would be willing to "go down on his knees" to plead to his people for calm.

Inviolability of borders has become the cornerstone of Karimov's policies in the region and outside, shared vigorously by other leaders in Central Asia. Karimov has sought to suppress potential challenges to Uzbekistan's territorial integrity by cracking down on Samarkand Tajiks. At the same time he has categorically rejected separatist rumblings in the Uzbek community of Tajikistan, where the idea of unification with Uzbekistan has been raised.

Territorial integrity is also the most important issue on the domestic and foreign policy agenda of the other major regional power—Kazakhstan. Its geography and ethnic make-up leave President Nursultan Nazarbayev with little room to maneuver in avoiding breakup and cementing the independence so recently gained. Forty-five percent of Kazakhstan's 17 million inhabitants are of Turkic origin, predominantly Kazakh; 45% are Slavs—mostly Russians, but also Russified Ukrainians. The remaining 10% are "miscellaneous"—the Volga Germans and Crimean Tartars deported by Stalin, Koreans, and other minorities.

## ANY ATTEMPT

by President Nazarbayev to introduce economic reforms involving significant privatization of state assets is likely to be tainted with allegations of ethnic bias owing to the uneven ethnic representation in various sectors of Kazakhstan's economy. Russians and other non-Kazakh minorities, which together constitute the majority of Kazakhstan's population, play the pivotal role in every sector of the economy. These include the ex-Soviet space launch complex and the vast agricultural

areas in the North developed in the late 1950s during Khrushchev's rule and known as the "virgin lands." "Russians make Kazakhstan run," many of them openly tell visitors, adding that, when it comes to privatizing industry and agriculture, they will lay claim to what they run now. And if the Kazakhs tell them to leave (as some Kazakh nationalists have) they will secede and split the country, taking their half and joining the Russian Federation.

The relative political calm in Kazakhstan is undoubtedly the greatest accomplishment of President Nazarbayev. He presides over a political process that so far has been much more tolerant than any other in Central Asia. The key to his success has been a publicly articulated desire

of the government to avoid perceptions of ethnic bias in favor of one or the other major group. If the president is Kazakh, the prime minister is a Slav. If Kazakh is the official state language, Russian is the "language of interethnic communication."

However, Kazakhstan's veneer of stability and civility may turn out to be thin. The rough substance of Kazakhstan's domestic politics and the question of control of the economy lies close to the surface, and no politician, not even Nazarbayev, may be able to smooth it out if it breaks out in the open.

There can be little doubt that the leaders of the other two Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan—Presidents Askar Akayev and Saparmurat Niyazov, respectively—also share this commitment to territorial status quo. Given their countries' size, economic constraints, uncertain national identity, and questionable boundaries, any territorial dispute would likely spell the end of them as independent states.

The tragedy and weakness of Central Asia's position after over a century of Russian and Soviet rule is reflected in its distorted pattern of economic development. Moscow exploited the region as a source of raw materials and agricultural goods with little or no regard for the environment and traditional ways of life. And Central Asia became dependent on Moscow for




deliveries of key industrial and consumer commodities and for heavy subsidies to sustain uneconomic and resource-consuming agriculture and mineral industries.

Politically, Central Asia is, in the words of one senior Russian official, a "semi-feudal, semi-Communist structure." Indeed, with the notable exception of Kyrgyzstan's President Akayev, current Central Asian leaders are former Communist Party bosses who have managed to keep old party structures and power, albeit under different names. They have preserved all the essential features of the old Soviet system in Central Asia: autocratic regimes (admittedly, of varying degree of intolerance); the survival of their countries has made these leaders run for the protective cover of the Commonwealth of Independent

ed 10 million ethnic Russians living in Central Asia, the biggest contributor to the CIS military budget, and the historic and intellectual homeland to tens of thousands of military personnel of Russian origin and their families deployed in Central Asia.

Second, the novelty and romance of political and cultural rapprochement with outside powers—most importantly Turkey, but also Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran—have been replaced by a more realistic assessment of such ties. While these Islamic contacts brought much-needed financial credits and added international recognition, not one of these countries could fill the void should Russia decide to withdraw its military, economic, and political presence.

#### ETHNIC GROUPS



Frontiers to watch: Central Asia's need for stabilization is dramatized by arms traffic to Tajikistan from fellow Tajiks clustered just across the border in Afghanistan. Ethnic tensions require effective governments everywhere in region no longer controlled by Moscow.

States and its most powerful member, Russia. Post-independence euphoria (which was not as strong anyway in Central Asia as in Ukraine or the Baltic states) quickly wore off and left the leaders of Central Asia with the realization that Russia is the only realistic regional military power capable of preserving a degree of peace.

## FIRST OF ALL,

Russia is already there as the leading military and political player in the CIS. It is also the historic homeland to an estimat-

Third, the price tag for regional and individual state security is too much for the straining economies of Central Asian countries. Having set forth initially ambitious plans for their own national security establishments, they quickly realized that such ambitions went beyond their means.

All Central Asian states with the exception of Tajikistan have signed bilateral security treaties with Russia which effectively provide for the stationing of Russian troops on their territories and Russian responsibility for the security of CIS external borders.

But no matter how much most Central Asian leaders strive to preserve Russia's

stabilizing military presence in the region, the future of Moscow's involvement there remains in question. So far, Boris Yeltsin and his government have gone along with requests for security assistance to Central Asia. But Russian foreign policy toward the countries of "near abroad," as the former Soviet republics have come to be somewhat condescendingly known, has yet to be fully formulated.

## IN MOSCOW

there is now a new choir of "enlightened imperialists"—influential converts from the liberal-democratic camp, including state councillor Sergei Stankevich and chairman of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee Yevgeny Ambartsumov. In Ambartsumov's words:

"Russia is something more than the Russian Federation in its current borders. Therefore, its geopolitical interests must be considered much more broadly than what is currently defined on the maps. Based on that, we intend to build our relations with 'near abroad.' Its cornerstone [will be] the defense of interests of compatriots and maximum fulfillment of national-state interests."

However eager Central Asia's leaders may be for an external stabilizing presence, such statements by prominent Russian politicians stir indignation and renewed fears of Russian imperialism.

Dear as such declarations may be to the hearts of Russian nationalist patriots, there is little chance of their practical implementation. Far from being able to flex its military muscle in Central Asia in pursuit of some ill-defined "geopolitical interests," Russia's obligation to help maintain the status quo in the region constitutes a huge sacrifice, considering the current economic weakness. Yeltsin's Moscow is not able to take on an even bigger military burden.

Furthermore, aggressive pursuit of "geopolitical interests" in Central Asia, implied in Ambartsumov's statement, could lead to military confrontation once more with Afghanistan. Russia is still reeling from its "Afghan syndrome." Its public is not likely to be ready for another Afghanistan any time soon.

## TO ERR

on the side of caution, it is important to recognize the limits of Western, as well as Russian, involvement in Central Asian affairs. It is particularly important to acknowledge that traditional Western cure-alls—democratization and economic liberalization—may for a long time be counter-

productive in Central Asian countries. Attempting to impose alien concepts on traditional societies steeped in different values could undermine the already frail foundations of civil peace.

But this risk should not mean the abandonment of Western democratic and free-market ideals in pursuit of policies toward Central Asia. The key should be gradualism and long-term commitment.

This means:

- Active dialogue with Central Asian governments about strategies for economic and political development and security.
- Assistance programs with adequate financing and skilled professionals.
- Exchange programs for scholars, students, and cultural groups.
- Involvement of private-sector aid organizations in the dialogue.

• In sum, a long-term, nonoffensive "propaganda by example" approach intended to (1) increase Central Asian nations' involvement in the international community, (2) help them formulate plans for political and economic development, and (3) create popular constituencies for gradual change.

The dialogue should not be limited to dealings with Central Asian governments. Special efforts should be made to seek out nongovernment leaders with constructive alternative ideas for development of their nations. Western participants should be prepared to find few such groups, and may in effect have to build them through "propaganda by example" programs.

## IN DESIGNING

economic assistance, priority should be given to alleviating widespread poverty rather than to abstract schemes for promoting private entrepreneurship.

Lessons learned from decades of success and failure in aiding third world nations will certainly apply in Central Asia. Its large but mostly unexplored mineral wealth, widespread poverty, and severe ecological needs present a promising opportunity for Western help. This is particularly true in regard to developing water resources, where strategically applied aid could produce disproportionately generous pay-offs that would be felt throughout Central Asian societies.

Governments and private international organizations should remind themselves that inaction is the worst kind of policy, and that nobody knows how long Central Asia's fragile peace will last. WM

WORLD MONITOR NOVEMBER 1992



Cross-border hero: Ahmed Shah Massoud

## UNITED NATIONS Security Council

S/25025

On 12/21/93, the Gov't of Tajikistan notified the UN Sec'y Gen. that "large numbers of troops massed in the border areas of the Islamic State of Afghanistan have repeatedly violated the State border of the Republic of Tajikistan. These actions cannot fail to arouse the concern of the people & Gov't of Tajikistan. Furthermore, it is regrettable that distorted reports on this subject are being disseminated by some of the world media; such reports are not serving the interests of either the Tajik or the Afghan side." Tajikistan "expresses the hope that all necessary means will be taken to prevent further violations of the Tajik-Afghan border." If the violations continue, Tajikistan will be forced to ask the Commonwealth of Independent States for assistance, but the Tajik Gov't hopes that a "mutually acceptable solution will be found" which will "not have an adverse effect on the friendly relations between the sides." And, Tajikistan hopes Afghanistan "will take the necessary steps to provide shelter for the refugees from Tajikistan who are temporarily there & to ensure their safety & speedy repatriation."



# Irregularities at Peshawar museum under fire

BUREAU REPORT

PESHAWAR, Dec 13: The large-scale embezzlement and irregularities in the Peshawar Museum and pilferage of rare release pertaining to Gandhara civilisation dominated the proceedings of NWFP Assembly on Sunday with the Jamaat-e-Islami and ANP being engaged in heated debate on different aspects of the issue.

It was a pity that a maximum of 36 members were present in the House out of a total of 83.

The discussions on the subject were taken up as a consequent of two identical adjournment motions by Haji Mohammad Adeel and Asfandvar Wali wherein it was alleged that a large number of relics had been removed from the museum and smuggled to foreign countries.

The original pieces, they added, had been replaced by fake ones. The House recommended the setting up of a special committee to

look into the scandal, fix the responsibilities and suggest measures to preserve and develop the rich cultural heritage of the province.

The Jamaat members led by Dr Mohammad Yaqub said that preservation of sculptures was un-Islamic and suggested that the matter should be referred to the Islamic Ideological Council to seek its advice. They were of the view that the practice was not part of our culture and ban should be imposed on images which were un-Islamic. On this point, Ghafoor Khan Jadoon said in that case the currency notes, passports and identity cards bearing the images were also un-Islamic and should be referred to the Council of Islamic Ideology.

Asfandvar Wali Khan explained that the House was discussing the 6,000-year-old culture and not the Islamic culture and it was the duty of the House to protect the Pagan culture and civilisation. The leader of ANP parliamentary

party Begum Nasim Wali Khan intervened to suggest that protection of old cultural heritage was not un-Islamic and religion should not be involved in such things. The Minister for Religious Affairs Haji Mohammad Javed told the House that the director of the museum had been charge-sheeted on the basis of the inquiry committee report.

PT - 12/14

(See article on next page.)




Figure 2. The reverse of the plain envelope shown in Figure 1. The black circular datestamp is the receiving postmark of Donetsk. The purple triangular cachet designates the cover as free express mail from an active-duty soldier.

## Kabul airport

Afghanistan will have to spend one million dollars to repair Kabul airport, damaged by Hikmatyar's blistering rocket attacks last August, and hopes foreign donors will provide the money, Civil Aviation Minister Dr. Abdur Rahman told Reuters news agency.

Afghanistan hopes to start regular passenger flights to London, Paris and Frankfurt, and has been in contact with French and British officials, the minister said in a recent interview.

Afghanistan's Ariana Airline already flies a weekly cargo flight to Frankfurt, and hopes to take passengers soon.

However, Kabul needs one million dollars to repairs its airport, where the control tower was burned by a rocket attack in August, and the charred skeletons of at least three planes were scattered on the tarmac, he said.

Kabul is short of funds and will need foreign aid to fund the repairs, the Aviation Minister said.

AFGHANews 12/1

## Premier office run by three deputies

After Abdul Saboor Fareed was sacked from the interim government because he supported his party's attacks on Kabul, his job was divided between three of his former deputies.

Engineer Ahmad Shah, who is also the interior minister, works in the prime minister's office on Saturdays and Thursdays; Haji Deen Mohammad, the education minister, on Mondays and Wednesdays; and Sayyed Salman Gailani, the foreign minister, on Sundays and Tuesdays.

Ahmad Shah belongs to Itihad of Prof. Sayyaf, Deen Mohammad to Hezb Islami (Khalis group), and Salman Gailani to the National Islamic Front of Pir Gailani.

AFGHANews 12/1

## Russia rejects Hezb's allegations

The Russian Federation has turned down plea by Hezb Islami leader to stop printing Afghan currency and said it would continue to do so under an inter-governmental agreement with Afghanistan.

Responding to a letter written by Hikmatyar, the Russian ambassador in Islamabad, Mr. Yakunin, said Russia was printing and supplying the Afghan currency to the present government of Afghanistan in accordance with the inter-governmental agreement on the basis of a commercial contract.

He denied Hikmatyar's assertion that printing of Afghans in Russia without gold reserves as backup was intended to further destabilize Afghanistan economically. "On the contrary it represents a good example of cooperation between the government of the Russian Federation and the government of Afghanistan," the envoy remarked.

AFGHANews 11/15

# Soviet Union field post in Afghanistan

By Ken Lawrence

War covers are perennial favorites of postal history buffs. As soon as any war breaks out, collectors try to assemble and record its postal evidence.

The Military Postal History Society has published extensive lists of United States military postal facilities that served Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1991.

This year, a collector friend in New York has been sending letters to hotels in the various Balkan capitals under siege, hoping to receive them back with explanatory postal markings that document the suspension of mail service to the war zones.

One of the most challenging philatelic pursuits in recent years has been to collect field post covers of Soviet forces on active service in Afghanistan.

I began my quest shortly after troops of the Soviet Union were ordered into Afghanistan in 1979, an event that reversed the thaw in relations between the then superpowers that had evolved during the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford and the first two years of Jimmy Carter's administration.

President Carter invoked trade sanctions and a boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow as retaliation for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and backed anti-Soviet Afghan insurgents based across the border in Pakistan with weapons, military training and intelligence.

Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev responded with a boycott of the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles four years later.

Despite the armed might of the Soviet forces and the squabbling disarray of rival anti-Soviet guerrilla leaders, the Soviet-backed Afghan regime was unable to prevail. As the war dragged on, soldiers' morale sagged.

By 1985, Soviet television stations were broadcasting interviews with returning soldiers who were openly con-




Figure 1. Two covers sent by Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan to Donetsk, Ukraine. Both covers bear field post markings. The numbers in the boxes are destination postal codes.

temptuous of the government's war aims, calling it "Russia's Vietnam."

The war nevertheless continued until this year. Even now, with the Soviet forces withdrawn, peace has not yet come to Afghanistan.

A war that lasts more than a decade ought to leave a lot of postal evidence, but no one I asked had seen any.

From 1981 to 1988, I corresponded with stamp collectors in every part of the Soviet Union from the Baltic coast to Central Asia to the Pacific, from the Arctic Circle to the Crimea. Not one was able to obtain a piece of soldier's mail from Afghanistan; they hadn't ever seen any.

Finally in 1989, I found an enterprising man in Ukraine who was willing to search, but he wanted more than stamps in exchange. He specifically required condoms and cassette tapes of American rock music.

More often than not, filling

such a request from a foreign collector leads to disappointment, because there's no way to enforce the terms of the agreement. But after almost a decade, I was willing to try even a faint prospect, so I sent the items he wanted.

About a month later, I got my prized covers, shown in the accompanying illustrations. The next task was to decipher their meaning.

Dmytro Bykovetz, who chairs the American Philatelic Society's Translation Service, translated the inscriptions and postal markings. Peter Michalove, a Rosica Society expert on World War II Soviet field posts, provided analysis.

Figure 1 shows the fronts of two covers, both sent by active-duty soldiers to members of their families back home in Donetsk, Ukraine, in 1986.

The envelope with the colorful spring crocuses cachet has a purple Soviet field post

handstamp. The plain envelope has a similar machine-applied marking in black ink.

Figure 2 shows the back of the plain envelope, with a Donetsk receiving handstamp in black ink and a triangular purple cachet across the back flap.

Michalove commented on the similarity of this cover to his WWII examples:

"The field post cancel itself (in the upper right corner, where the stamp would be for franked mail), reads, SSSR/POLEVAYA POCHTA (USSR field POST), with no FPO number in the cancel.

"The manuscript' return address locates the sender at FPO 24838. The use of unnumbered FPO cancels with a five-digit FPO number in the return address is exactly the way FPO mail in World War II was identified starting in April 1943.

"But what's really interesting about your cover is the triangular military cachet on the reverse. It reads, Pis'mo voennno-sluzhbasch/srochnoi sluzhby/Besplatno (Letter of active serviceman/express service/post free).


"It's very similar to triangular cachets that indicated post free mail on soldiers' letters before World War II and, less commonly, during the war. I've read that the triangular markings were reintroduced after the war, and I have a 1947 example with a nice clean strike of an obviously brand new canceler."

The covers my trading partner sent have two different styles of the purple cachet. ■

LINN'S STAMP NEWS 27  
DECEMBER 28, 1992

## Pakistan opens new consulate in Mazar

The government of Pakistan has decided to upgrade its two consulates in Afghanistan, besides opening a new consulate general in Mazar-i-Sharif. AFGHANews 12/1



The Chronology section of the November 1992 issue of the Afghanistan Forum gave a report on Mr. Rafsanjani's visit to Pakistan. In his 9-point guideline statement, Mr. Rafsanjani appears as being very tender, caring & sympathetic towards Afghanistan. I wish in reality he would act the same. Unfortunately, the reality is different.

In the above picture, the man in the lamb hat is Karim Khalilli, the chairman of the Shiite parties backed by Iran. He is an Iranian; he was born in Iran; he doesn't have any relatives or property in Afghanistan; he carries the citizenship card of Iran. This is the reality! In spite of this, Mr. Rafsanjani says, "...that neither country [the other being Pakistan, Ed.] was intervening in Afghanistan...." Bullshit!

It is a fact that Afghanistan has a Shiite population with Ayatollah Assif Mohsenni as its leader & spokesman for the leading council of Afghanistan. If Mr. Rafsanjani didn't want to interfere in Afghanistan's domestic affairs, why would he designate Karim Khalilli, an Iranian, to be a leader in Afghanistan?

In the fall of 1991, when the Afghan Mujahideen mission came to ceremonially participate in the UN General Assembly meeting, I went to the Roosevelt Hotel in New York to see Mr. Mojadeddi & learn about the events & future fate of Afghanistan. In my visit with Mr. Mojadeddi, he

introduced me to 3 of his new companions, clothed in Iranian religious costume & speaking Iranian Farsi. I had never seen these men before, nor had they ever accompanied Mr. Mojadeddi in his prior visits to the UN. I wondered why they were there & whom they represented because the thin beard, flat nose & high cheekbones of the Afghan Hazaras were not visible in these men.

I asked Karim Khalilli what part of Afghanistan he came from. This question made the whole room quiet & Mr. Mojadeddi tried to change the subject by talking to his security officer. But I gazed straight at Mr. Khalilli & waited for an answer. I could see that he & his friends were ill at ease, but I was shocked to hear from Mr. Khalilli when he responded in a very weak tone, "To be honest, I don't know what part of Afghanistan I am from; my father & grandfather would tell us we are from Ghazni. I was born in Iran." I asked if he had recently been to Ghazni. "No, I have never been to Afghanistan or Ghazni."

Since 1989, Rafsanjani has tried very hard to convince the Afghan Mujahideen leaders based in Pakistan to accept his representatives in their group, claiming that out of the 5 million refugees, 2 million are in Iran & 3 million in Pakistan. Pakistan created 6 political parties, making up the Mujahideen gov't in exile. Rafsanjani insists that he had created 8 political parties in Iran & that they must have equal shares in the gov't in exile.

He was right in that Pakistan had screened over 60 Afghan political groups & had recognized only the 6 parties who could show more loyalty to Pakistan. But, the Pakistani-based leaders were all citizens of Afghanistan & were created to carry on the Jihad inside Afghanistan against the Red Army. On the contrary, in Iran, there was only one Afghan Shiite leader, Ayatollah Assif Mohseni. The additional 8 parties were created by Iran after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. This was done solely for Iranian political purposes, not for the Afghan Jihad. The Afghan people condemned this evil intrigue & conspiracy of Rafsanjani - as they had condemned Iranian leaders for having brainwashed Afghan youths & transferred them to the Iran-Iraq war front where thousands of Afghans were killed.

We cordially request Mr. Rafsanjani to stop his interference in our internal affairs under the name of supporting the rights of Shiites. The rights of Shiites in Afghanistan were never violated; on the contrary, the rights of Sunnis in Iran, 21% of the Iranian population, have been severely violated by the Shiite regime of Iran. Afghan Shiites have always had their members in the Afghan senate, the house of representatives & other Afghan Gov't agencies. In Iran you cannot find a single Sunni member in the parliament. Despite the fact that only 12-15% of the Afghan population has a formal education, 30-40% of our medical doctors, university professors, teachers, employees in banks & other Gov't enterprises are Shiites.

The Sunnis & Shiites of Afghanistan have always worked shoulder to shoulder in the development of their country; they fought against the Red Army together. To be honest, one hardly heard "Sunni" or "Shiite" in Afghanistan prior to the Shiite revolution of Imam Khomeini.

Now Iran, to promote her superiority & supremacy in the region, would like to export her so-called revolution to Afghanistan & the rest of the Muslim nations. She wants to create disturbance & confusion in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, Burhanuddin Rabbani, against the wishes of the Afghan nation, has been attracted by the school of Khomeini. He has been instrumental in promoting Rafsanjani's policy in the region & has been recruited to be Rafsanjani's partner in this unpopular dance. Both of them have been trying to, as the old Afghan saying goes, "Muddy the water & catch the fish."

Abdul Wassil  
Wethersfield, Connecticut

[Mr. Wassil attended the University of Connecticut in the 1960s & worked in the Afghan Interior Ministry before the war. He was imprisoned after the Saur Coup but released to house arrest after a general amnesty. He escaped to Pakistan in 1983 & came to the US in 1985.]

## Loya Jerga

Historically Afghanistan is an ancient, multiple tribal-based type of nation. These tribes, through the passage of time, have learned how to peacefully solve the critical problems arising among them.

With the spread & rise of Islam in ancient Afghanistan, this tradition of peaceful settlement of the problems in & among various Afghan tribes was further strengthened.

This joint consultation & problem solution process is called "Jerga" in Afghanistan. "Jerga" is actually a Turkish word, & "Loy" or "Loya" is a Pashto word meaning grand, great or big. So, "Loya Jerga" means "Grand Assembly" of all the population participating in the consultation & affected by the situation with no privilege for or discrimination against any representative group or individual. The process of selecting the representative individuals to the Loya Jerga is democratic.

A Loya Jerga is called only when the country faces a great crisis or certain very important decisions have to be made concerning war & peace. All the participants of the Loya Jerga are expected to express their views in the gathering quite freely & openly. Unfortunately this sacred, effective & traditional legal body is often misused. The cloth has not been cut to fit the body but the body has been trimmed to suit the dress.

At present the Islamic Gov't in Kabul is not in a position to expand its authority & control over the country. There is not law & order. Different parts of the country are controlled by local commanders. Various neighboring groups live in animosity with each other. Fighting, looting & raping continue in Kabul. Now the Kabul Gov't feels its failure more than ever. These days they are talking of a national gathering.

I want to emphasize that the principal matter in that gathering must be the voice & will of the majority, which is to be heard & put into practice no matter under what terms or ways. Without considering this very basic right of the Afghans, whatever is done, under whatever cover, it is certainly doomed to fail & will not gain the support of the population.

A general election would have been the best solution of the present crisis in Afghanistan. Since now this is not easily possible, the convening of a Loya Jerga seems to be the only possible way left.

In any case, the forthcoming national gathering must be held under the strict supervision of the UN. At the same time peace-keeping forces of the UN must take responsibility throughout the country.

The leadership of all political parties - open or clandestine - local & regional commanders & other chieftans must commit themselves well in advance to the jurisdictions of the Loya Jerga

or national gathering.

Let us hope that the Afghan people are thus given their right to decide what type of gov't they want.

Abdul Rahman Pazhwak  
Peshawar, Pakistan

[[Career diplomat A.R. Pazhwak represented Afghanistan at the UN & was President of the 21st UN General Assembly in 1966. He is also a poet & writer.]]

## Rabbani to continue

KABUL (AFP) — Burhanuddin Rabbani, acting president of Afghanistan, is almost certain to have his four-month term as the nation's leader extended when it expires Thursday, sources in the various parties indicated.

The decision to endorse the respected religious scholar or to replace him with a new leader will be made today at a meeting of Afghanistan's supreme ruling body, the Leadership Council.

Until the delayed Grand Assembly, or Shoorā Hal-o-Aqd, which is to choose a permanent head of state, is convened, a new interim president must be selected to fill the hiatus.

Rabbani is the most likely candidate for the top slot, not only because his administration offers continuity, but also by default of many of his rivals.

A number of them are awaiting the Shoorā to stake their claims to be definitive president, while others were said Wednesday to be having health problems.

Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, leader of the Harakat-i-Inqilab mujahideen faction, and a one-time favourite for the post of new interim leader, has left Kabul for Peshawar because of poor health.

Nabi will be represented at the Leadership Council by his deputy, Mohammad Shah Fazli, chief of the Supreme Court.

Fazli said Nabi might be a candidate for president at the Shoorā, but only after his selection was approved by his party.

Sheikh Assef Mohseni, leader of the Shiite mujahideen party Harakat-i-Islami, is having medical treatment in Britain, and will also probably be represented today by his deputy Shah Jahan Ahmadi, the Leadership Council spokesman.

Abdul Ali Mazari, General Secretary of the Central Committee of Hezb-i-Wahdat, a nine-party coalition of Shiite Hazaras,

said Wednesday that Wahdat would send a representative to the Leadership Council meeting and was not seeking the interim presidency post.

Mazari expressed optimism that the Shoorā Hal-o-Aqd would be held within a month, at which time a Wahdat candidate would be a contender for president.

The head of the Mahaz-i-Mill-i-Islami party, Pir Sayyad Ahmad Gilani, an expected runner in the leadership race, has also opted out, according to unconfirmed but well-placed sources.

Generally recognised as a royalist who has links with the former Afghan king, Zahir Shah, Gilani is thought to be marshalling his followers for the Shoorā.

Gilani was on hand Wednesday to greet the arrival in Kabul of another royalist, Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, whose supporters were out in strength waving flowers, Islamic banners and picture posters of their leader.

Mujaddedi arrived in Kabul from Jalalabad escorted by Rabbani himself and a huge convoy of jeeps bristling with enthusiastic mujahideen followers who fired numerous volleys into the air.

Interviewed after a late lunch hosted by Rabbani at Dilkusha Palace, Mujaddedi said that he was not running for president again.

"I am neither a candidate for the new interim presidency, nor the leadership to be decided by the Shoorā Hal-o-Aqd," he said.

He also said he had not yet decided whether to attend today's meeting or not.

Yunus Khales, who heads the moderate faction of Hezb-i-Islami that broke away from Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's radical parent group in 1979, is reported as not attending the Shoorā due to sickness.

Frontier Post 10/29

# Power tussle not to end easily

## MONITORING REPORT

**B**ERNARD Robin professor in Columbia University commented that a Loya Jirga or Shooras could not do what has been accomplished by the jirgas in the past. He said that in the past such jirgas or Shooras were convened by the rulers for the sake of popular support, VOA reports. But today, nobody is actually holding power. At a time when arms are abundantly available, no one is able to forcibly grab power.

He said that presently the Afghan capital is in the grip of fighting between various armed groups of Mujahideen. He held the foreign powers responsible for the present situation in Afghanistan. Because in the cold war era, instead of solving the problems of Afghanistan, they sent huge arms deliveries there.

He added that the Afghan people only could help solve the problems of their country. He said even this Shooras might be given the traditional name but

this will not carry the function of the Jirgas and Shooras held in the past. The Shooras which is yet to be convened is a very complicated one and it should represent all the groupings in the country. Only a broad-based government could help solve the problems of the country, but this too, will take a long time.

About the policy of the new US administration about Afghanistan, Robin said that he had held talks with the transitional team of the President-elect Bill Clinton on the matter and it seems that it will pursue the policy of the previous administration, which had no clear-cut policy about Afghanistan. He said whenever the US new administration will think over about its policy on Afghanistan, it will do so keeping in view the situation in the whole region and Central Asia. And the new policy may cover also all the republics of Central Asia. He said that the new administration may face the crisis of Central Asia, because at the moment, fighting is continuing in

Afghanistan as well as in the neighbouring former Soviet Republic of Tajikistan.

**M**AULVI Mohammad Yunus Khalis issued a statement in Jalalabad Saturday in which he announced that he will contest the elections for the presidency of Afghanistan. According to the report of the Afghan Islamic Press, Maulvi Khalis has appealed to all the jihad commanders, Ulema, elders, and Mujahideen organisations to extend their support to him.

Maulvi Khalis left Peshawar for Afghanistan Friday. The tenure of present Interim President Burhanuddin Rabbani, which was extended for one month by the Leadership Council, is completing next Tuesday.

So far, Interim President Burhanuddin Rabbani and the leader of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, Pir Syed Ahmad Gilani have announced their candidature for the presidency. President Burhanuddin Rabbani is of the

opinion that the next president should be elected by the Shooras-e-Hal-o-Aqd while Pir Gilani and several other leaders say that the Leadership Council should elect the president.

**T**HE Shooras-e-Hal-o-Aqd was scheduled to hold its meeting in Kabul Saturday but only on 50 out of the total 1400 members of the Shooras have so far reached Kabul, BBC reports. The spokesman of the Leadership Council and leader of the Harakat-e-Islami reports, Ayatullah Mohsini has said that holding of the Shooras meeting on its scheduled time is very difficult.

He called for an emergent meeting of the Leadership Council and asked the chiefs of the organisations to attend the meeting themselves instead of sending representatives so that proper deliberation is held on the present situation. He said that if the meeting of the Shooras-e-Hal-o-Aqd is not convened on schedule then the Leadership Council should elect another president for the interim period.

However, a spokesman of President Rabbani, Aziz Murad has said that the Shooras meeting will be held before the expiry of the tenure of President Rabbani.

He said that members of the Shooras are likely to arrive in Kabul right at the time when the meeting will start because there is a great accommodation problem in Kabul. However, he did not make it clear as to when these members will reach Kabul. He said that President Rabbani will not surrender power to the Leadership Council till the holding of the meeting of the Shooras-e-Hal-o-Aqd.

## Afghanistan, Armed and Abandoned, Could Be

To the Editor:

In articles analyzing states and peoples suffering from weapons and conflicts left over from the cold war, such as "Clinton Inherits Conflicts That Don't Follow the Rules" (The Week in Review, Dec. 13), you include Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the successor states of the Soviet Union and some others. But you and others omit Afghanistan, where a cold-war regional conflict has turned into another post-cold-war state breakdown.

Since last spring's change of power, political alliances have shifted. The largely ethnic battles that replaced the ideological struggle have killed thousands, driven hundreds of thousands from their homes and devastated the capital, Kabul. More than a million refugees have returned to rural areas, resulting in an increase in deaths and injuries from land mines scattered through the country. Among the weapons causing deaths and injuries were rockets, fragmentation bombs, and other matériel supplied by the United States.

There are advance warnings of hunger and ethnic cleansing. The Soviet Union's counterinsurgency strategy destroyed much of the agricultural infrastructure. Before last year, Kabul received grants of about 250,000 tons of Soviet wheat. Now the

silos are empty. Furthermore, the roads leading to Kabul are blocked by factions with grievances against the interim Government. These groups are tentatively armed with weapons formerly supplied and paid for by the Soviet Union, the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China and Iran.

Prof. Felix Ermacora, United Nations' Human Rights Commission's special rapporteur on Afghanistan, warned in a recent report to the General Assembly of the danger of "Yugoslavia-like events." Since then, clashes between Sunnite and Shiite Muslims have led to expulsion of Shites from a provincial center in Southwest Afghanistan. Violent clashes over power have resumed in Kabul.

Afghanistan is also becoming increasingly involved in the violence in Tajikistan. More than 100,000 refugees from that former Soviet republic have crossed Afghanistan's northern border, where thousands a day braved the icy waters of the Amu Darya to seek refuge in the relative calm of Afghanistan's Tajik northeast. Many drowned. Uzbek forces from northern Afghanistan have evacuated fellow Uzbeks from Tajikistan, while weapons and fighters freely cross the border.

No one suggests sending troops to Afghanistan. But the United Nations

## the Next Bosnia

has issued a consolidated appeal for \$180 million to meet Afghanistan's emergency needs. The total response from the world community has been about \$70 million, slightly more than one-tenth of the yearly United States allocation for military aid to the Afghan resistance in 1986-89. The Kabul Government has called for international conferences on Afghan needs.

Some bitter Afghans suggest that now that they have sacrificed a tenth of their population and 50 years of investments in infrastructure and education to a war that helped weaken the Soviet Union, the rest of the world would prefer to forget about them. Outside powers cannot solve Afghanistan's problems, though we played a role in creating them. We can, however, help alleviate some of the suffering.

BARNETT R. RUBIN  
New York, Dec. 25, 1992

The writer, director of Columbia University's Center for the Study of Central Asia, is an associate professor of political science.

The Muslim  
12/14



NYT 12/28

# ORGANIZATIONS

To the Editor:

11/14/92

Thank you very much for mentioning BICYCLES FOR AFGHAN AMPUTEES' REHABILITATION in your November issue. Reading your account on page 2 was quite a pleasant surprise. However, in the interest of accuracy, please indulge the following: First, our zip code is 94122. Also, our rehabilitation center is at Ningarhar Public Health Hospital in Jalalabad, not in a Peshawar Hospital.

Finally, BAAR is not my brain child. I'm not guilty of modesty when I say that our child has many brains for its parents. Amputee bicyclists from the US, Pakistan & Afghanistan along with health care workers from those 3 countries all had vital roles to play in BAAR's formation. Of course, I must admit that I found this comment very flattering.

I was very pleased by the article & will take it to show our staff in Jalalabad next month.

Howard Williams  
Executive Director  
BAAR  
4226 Irving St.  
San Francisco, CA 94122  
(415) 566-6384

[We apologize for the errors, the Editor's, not the Proofreader's, & we thank Mr. Williams for correcting them. Ed.]

The AFGHAN REFUGEES FUND, P.O. Box 176, Los Angeles, CA 94023, since its formation in 1980, has raised over \$3 million. The Fund supports inoculations, orthopedic devices, training for Afghan medical workers, gynecological & obstetrical care, primary school education, job-skill programs, cottage industries & the Afghan Children's Hospital (See FORUM XX, #5, p.4). Donations to the ARF are now "helping with the enormous costs of repatriation under the fledgling democratic gov't." All the Fund's fundraising & administration are done by volunteers so that every dollar goes for direct assistance to the Afghan people.



## U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

1025 Vermont Avenue, N.W., Suite 920  
Washington, DC 20005  
Tel: (202) 347-3507 Fax: (202) 347-3418

The COMMITTEE has issued a new paper on Afghan repatriation, Left Out in the Cold: The Perilous Homecoming of Afghan Refugees. Individual copies are available from the USCR at the above address for \$4 each. Multiple orders of 10 copies or more, \$3 each. The prices include postage & handling. Author Hiram Ruiz spent 3 months in Iran, Pakistan & Afghanistan assessing the progress of repatriation and how the returnees were faring. He reports that "many of the returnees don't have enough food for the winter. Also, tens of thousands of former residents of Kabul who were displaced by the battle of control for that city... are still living in tents that offer little protection from harsh winter weather. According to the UN, 'The winter will...exact a high toll in human lives, unless urgent relief measures are taken now.' The situation is further complicated by the recent arrival in northern Afghanistan of 5,000 refugees fleeing civil war in Tajikistan. Another 140,000 displaced Tajiks are scattered along the Afghan border, most without food & shelter. ... Of the \$17.6m that in November the UN said was urgently needed to meet winter 'emergency' needs, donors have only pledged \$3.3m."

Here's one we find hard to believe!  
HAZARA HERALD, 4746 Spottswood,  
Suite 1, Memphis, TN 38117. In  
their own words:

In terms of exposure to the Gospel, the Hazara people are among the world's least evangelized people in the world. The evangelization of unreached people, like Hazara Afghans, is one of the greatest challenges facing the Christian mission today.

You can participate in creative efforts  
to reach the Hazara Afghans through

**PRAYER,  
SERVICE, and  
SUPPORT.**



# RECENT PUBLICATIONS

## ARTHUR PAUL AFGHANISTAN COLLECTION

The Arthur Paul Afghanistan Collection at the University Library, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE 68182, is the home for the largest collection of material on Afghanistan kept in one place in the US. The collection is available to all national & international scholars. This growing collection has the full commitment of the library staff who are trying to acquire all types of material dealing with Afghanistan for the Collection. The Collection not only has grown through purchases from various publishers & vendors, but also enjoys the support of scholars in the field who donate their material to the library. In addition to the purchases through normal channels, the library staff make special efforts to acquire material which probably will not appear in publishers' catalogues available in the US. Robert Runyon, the Director of the University Library, has taken several trips to Europe & Asia to arrange for acquiring additional material for the Collection. During Mr. Runyon's most recent trip, to Pakistan in July & August, he visited 160 international organizations which are concerned with the Afghan problem. Mr. Runyon brought back a wealth of information on Afghanistan which could not have been acquired through normal purchases. His recent acquisitions will become available for public usage after it is catalogued on the On-Line Computer Library Center (OCLC).

Shaista Wahab  
University Library  
Omaha, Nebraska

Some recent titles catalogued on the OCLC include the following:

Ahman, N.D. THE SURVIVAL OF AFGHANISTAN, 1749-1979: a diplomatic history with an analytic & reflective approach, Inst of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 1990. 348 pp.

Christense, Hanne. THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AFGHANISTAN: A CHANCE FOR RURAL WOMEN,

UN Research Inst. for Social Development, Geneva, 1990. 90 pp.

Development Alternatives, Inc. Survey III: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF BORDER CATCHMENT POINTS & THEIR ROLE IN CROSS-BORDER TRADE BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN, Prepared for the Office of the AID representative to Afghanistan, Peshawar, 1990. 34 pp.

Jones, Schuyler. AFGHANISTAN, Clio Press, Oxford & Santa Barbara, 1992. 279 pp.

Tamarov, Vladislav. AFGHANISTAN - SOVIET VIETNAM, Mercury House, San Francisco (transl. from the Russian), 1992. 183 pp.

Thall, Michael. LET SLEEPING AFGHANS LIE, Walker, New York, 1990. 250 pp.

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THE FATEFUL PEBBLE: Afghanistan's Role in the Fall of the Soviet Empire by Anthony Arnold will be published in late January by Presidio Press, 505B San Marin Dr., Suite 300, Novato, CA 94945-1340. ISBN 0-89141-461-4.

From Cambridge University Press, 40 West 20th St., New York, NY 10011-4211:

MOSCOW & THE MIDDLE EAST - Soviet Policy Since the Invasion of Afghanistan by Robert O. Freedman. 1991. 438 pp. \$59.95 h.c; \$17.95 paper.

TURKO-PERSIA IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, edited by Robert Canfield, contains essays by Richard Frye, Yuri Bregel, Milan Hauner, Michel Mazzaoui, Francis Robinson & Nazif Shahrani as well as by Prof. Canfield. 1991. 248 pp. \$59.95.

The Islamic culture that developed in the ninth and tenth centuries in what is now Eastern Iran was to have a significant impact on most Muslims of west, south and central Asia. Under the patronage of Persianized Turkic Muslim rulers, the culture spread westward to the Mediterranean and eastward into India. Especially in the early centuries of Islam, Turko-Persia represented a distinctive variant of Islamic life and thought in much of Asia. After the fifteenth century regional variants started to emerge, and by the modern period, it had lost most of its unique features. In this collection, the contributors write about different aspects of that culture.

Also from Cambridge:

## **International Journal of Middle East Studies**

Published under the auspices of the Middle East Studies Association of North America

The journal publishes original research on the political, social and cultural history of the Middle East from the seventh century to the present day. The journal also covers Spain, south-east Europe and the Soviet Union for the periods in which their territories were under the influence of Middle Eastern civilization. Particular attention is paid to the history, politics, economics, anthropology, sociology, literature and folklore of the area and to comparative religion, theology, law and philosophy. Each issue contains approximately 50 pages of detailed book reviews. Subscribers also receive the *MESA Bulletin* free (two issues: July and December).

Quarterly plus 2 Bulletins (ISSN 0020-7438)  
Subscription to Vol. 24 (1992): \$110.00

## **Bartered Brides**

*Politics, Gender and Marriage in an Afghan Tribal Society*

**Nancy Tapper**  
*University of London*

*Bartered Brides* is an original study of marriage among the Maduzai, a tribal society in Afghan Turkistan. It looks in depth at both the domestic aspects of marriage and its relation to the productive and reproductive activities of women, as well as marriage as a means of managing political and economic conflict and competition. Nancy Tapper presents both male and female perspectives, detailed case studies and historical and statistical material. As an ethnographic and historical record, *Bartered Brides* breaks new ground in the study of Islam, the Middle East and South Asia. As the most detailed and extensive discussion of a Middle Eastern marriage system to date, it contributes to wider anthropological studies of marriage, politics and gender.

*Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology* 74

1991/335 pp./11 halftones/23 line diagrams/3 maps

Free from the US Institute of Peace, 1550 M St., NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20005-1708 (202) 429-3839: Afghanistan & Post-Soviet Central Asia (July, 1992).

E.J. Brill Publishers announced that their Anti-quarian Department has become an independent company & will be known as HET OOSTERS ANTIQUARIUM, under the direction of R. Smitskamp, Nieuwe Rijn 2, 2312 JB Leiden, the Netherlands. Mr. Smitskamp will continue to publish the Ancient Near East & Islamic Middle East catalogues.

Publications recently noted by the ACBAR Resource & Information Centre in Peshawar:

**AFGHANISTAN: A DOUBLE-FACED DIPLOMACY**; facts of the appearance & establishment of the communist gov't in Kabul & reasons for its military occupation & withdrawal of the Russians from Afghanistan [Farsi], Nasir Mastory Kashani, Iranshahar, Tehran, 1992. 162 pp.

**HISTORICAL & TRADITIONAL JIRGAH & LOYA JIRGAH WHICH WILL SOLVE THE NATIONAL PROBLEMS** [Dari], Lahore, 1991. 64 pp.

**COLLECTION OF MOH'D HUSSAIN TALIB KANDAHARI'S POETRY** [Dari], Khalilullah Khalili, Writers' Assn of Afghanistan, Kabul, 1990. 133 pp.

**SELECTED POETRY OF ABDUL RAHMAN** [Dari], Writers' Assn of Afghanistan, Kabul 1990. 95 pp. & **SHORT STORIES FROM AFGHANISTAN**, also from WAA, Kabul, 1990. 183 pp.

Newsletter from the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, Vol. I, nos. 1 & 2, September - October 1992, Peshawar.

**AFGHANISTAN & THE SOVIET WAR: The FACTOR OF COMMUNIST DESTRUCTION** [Farsi], Amir Etemad Danishyar, Tehran, 1992. 417 pp., photos.

**THE PRESENT ROLE OF AFGHAN WOMEN & CHILDREN** by Nancy Hatch Dupree, Bernard van Leer Foundation, Studies & Evaluation Papers #7, The Hague, July 1992. 16 pp. ISSN 0925-2983. [Available from the Foundation, P.O.Box 82334, 2508 EH The Hague, The Netherlands.]

**AFGHANISTAN**, compiled by Schuyler Jones, is part of the World Bibliographical Series published by Clio Press, Oxford, England. 1992, 281 pp. \$43.95.

**DANZIGER'S ADVENTURES: FROM MIAMI TO KABUL** by Nick Danziger, Harper Collins, London, 1992. 290 pp. \$17.99.

**THE PULICHARKI PRISON: A COMMUNIST INFERNO IN AFGHANISTAN** by M. Osman Rustar, edited by Ehsanullah Azari who also translated it from the original Persian, WUFA, P.O. Box 867, University P.O., Peshawar. 106 pp. \$15 (paper).

From the University of Chicago Press,  
5801 S. Ellis Ave., Chicago, IL 60637:

## The History of Cartography, Volume 2, Book 1

Cartography in the Traditional Islamic  
and South Asian Societies

Edited by J. B. Harley  
and David Woodward

This comprehensive history of Islamic and South Asian cartography offers a fascinating picture of maps used not only as practical tools but also as images symbolic of religion and culture.

"[The History of Cartography] is sure to be the standard reference for all subsequent scholarship... a vast collection of knowledge." —John Noble Wilford, *New York Times Book Review*

Cloth \$125.00 664 pages  
20 page color insert, 40 color plates, 255 halftones

A HISTORICAL ATLAS OF SOUTH ASIA (2nd Impression with additional material) by Joseph E. Schwartzberg, 1992, is available from Oxford University Press, Humanities Marketing, Dept. MG, 200 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016.

From the University of South Carolina Press, 1716 College St., Columbia, SC 29208:



## ISLAM AND THE HEROIC IMAGE Themes in Literature and the Visual Arts by John Renard

Explores Islam's vast religious and cultural traditions to spotlight the heroic personalities that have inspired Muslim audiences for more than a millennium. John Renard discusses the formation and function of heroic themes and the ways in which Muslims have interpreted these themes in literature and art. "The first thematic survey of pan-Islamic literature that I know of."

—Wheeler Thackston, *Harvard University*  
ISBN 0-87249-832-8, \$49.95 cloth

## THE OTHER SIDES OF PARADISE

Explorations into the Religious  
Meanings of Domestic Space in Islam  
by Juan E. Campo

"Demonstrates that the symbol of the house has been significant both in the historical development of Islamic doctrine and in the continued personal employment of sacred meaning within domestic space in modern Islamic society."

*Library Journal*  
ISBN 0-87249-738-0, \$49.95 cloth

William Trousdale (PhD, History of Art 1967) is a curator in the Department of Anthropology of the National Museum of Natural History of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C. He has just completed two books: *Kandakar in the Nineteenth Century* (an urban study based on early plans, drawings, photos and accounts) and *The*

*British in Afghanistan, 1878-81* (an annotated roster of ca. 60,000 British military and civilians in Afghanistan during the second Anglo-Afghan war; includes citations to records, writings, photographs, burials, etc.). He is currently writing a short monograph on the Social Dynamics of RMX and Freestyle and is working on a long-range project report of his archaeological work in Southwestern Afghanistan, 1971-1978

Center for Middle Eastern and North African  
Studies Newsletter • September-October 1992

## BOOK REVIEWS

*The Pandits: British Exploration of Tibet and Central Asia.* By DEREK WALLER. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky. viii, 327 pp. \$30.00.

The British Raj dispatched a series of Indian agents into the lands across India's northern borders between 1865 and 1893. This drive to map and catalog the geography and resources of these regions stemmed from two sources. First, the British Government of India perceived its need to know about these areas for economic, military, and political purposes, particularly in light of Russian movements into Central Asia. Second, the British officials of the Great Trigonometrical Survey (from 1878, part of the Survey of India) held the particularly Victorian desire to plot all of the "unknown" areas of the earth. Since Europeans could not enter these areas—officially closed by their rulers—without great personal risk, Indian agents of the British Raj went secretly in their stead.

Derek Waller presents a narrative of the journeys of these Indian agents into Afghanistan, Central Asia, Nepal, Tibet, Sikkim, and Bhutan. Much of his book recounts the occasionally fatal exertions of these Indian agents (known collectively as "The Pandits") to reach and locate the major geographical features and cities of these regions. Waller describes each journey in rich detail. He mentions but does not analyze, however, British racial presuppositions that defined the position of these Indian agents in the Survey. For example, in the reports of their British superiors, these Indian agents usually appeared only with code names, ostensibly to protect their identities, leading to British depersonalization of them: "The Pandit," "The Mullah," or "The Munshi" (for Nain Singh, Ata Muhammad, and Abdul Subhan, respectively). Waller varies in his own narrative between sometimes following his British sources by using these epithets and sometimes using personal names. Significantly, the British at first doubted the capacities of these Indian agents to carry out scientific procedures, for example, surveying with sextant and hypsometer. By the 1870s, however, British explorers were themselves requesting that the Survey provide their own expeditions with trained Indian subordinates to carry out these surveying functions. While the British members of the Survey generally received acclaim, gold medals, and honor from the Royal Geographical Society for the accomplishments of their Indian subordinates, the latter received such recognition less regularly.

On the British side, Waller focuses on the officials of the Survey for whom geographical knowledge for its own sake remained the goal—together with the glory and recognition that came with such explorations. While the British Raj had many economic, political, and military agendas for these northern borderlands, Waller mentions them only in passing. In one particularly telling chapter on secrecy, Waller does highlight the conflicts between the Government of India (which desired to retain exclusive control over the information produced by the Survey) and British officials of the Survey who desired acclaim and the free flow of ideas through the publication of these reports and maps in Britain, and in Russia as well.

Waller presents a clear narrative of the journeys of many of these Indian agents of the Survey. He organizes his chapters by geographical region, which leads to some small repetition of the larger historical context as he moves from one region to the next. He draws upon both English-language manuscript records of the British Raj and some of its British officials, as well as on many of the accounts of these Indian agents that were published only in limited editions. Readers interested in the early travels in these territories and those wishing to study the history of British efforts to gain information about the lands bordering India to the north via Indian agents will find this a well-researched and well-presented volume.

## Journal of Asian

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November 1992

MICHAEL H. FISHER  
Oberlin College

# The Agony Of the Enemy

## How Soviet Soldiers Fared in Afghanistan

### ZINKY BOYS

#### Soviet Voices From the Afghanistan War

By Svetlana Alexievich  
Norton. 197 pp. \$19.95

By Rob Schultheis

Wars do more than demonize; they blur the very human existence of those on the other side of the battle lines. Even supposedly impartial observers, like journalists, are not immune. Those of us who covered the war in Afghanistan from the *mujaheddin* side may have wanted to understand and empathize with the Soviet grunts and pilots who shot at us, bombed and rocketed us, but in the end most of us failed. The gulf of combat was just too wide, contacts across it too rare, evanescent. In my seven years of covering the war, from 1984 through 1991, I managed to interview just two Soviet deserters, and I glimpsed two other Soviets on the battlefield: a door-gunner, peering from a hovering Mi-8 helicopter, and a MiG pilot, a ghostly face in a silver fuselage, snapping in and out of my field of vision in split seconds. That was all. The rest of what I knew of the Soviets came from stories told by mujaheddin and refugees, and the published reports of international human rights groups. They remained malign, fearsome shadows, not quite real except in their ability to kill.

"Zinky Boys" brings to vivid life the Soviet men and women who served in Afghanistan, and bitter lives (and deaths) they are too. The title, a slang word coined by Soviet soldiers in-country, refers to the sealed zinc-lined coffins the war dead were shipped home in, during the years Moscow denied there was really a war going on just across the U.S.S.R.'s southern border. Byelorussian journalist Svetlana Alexievich, who collected these interviews with veterans, widows and bereaved

mothers, met with rage and outrage in her homeland when "Zinky Boys" was first published there in 1990, and no wonder. These are agonizing tales.

A nurse tells how she volunteered to serve in Afghanistan after she was told she would be "helping the Afghan people to put an end to feudalism and build a wonderful socialist society." The military hospital she was assigned to in Kabul had formerly been a riding stable; "one syringe for all the patients, and the officers drank the surgical spirit so we had to use petrol to clean the wounds." The killing of a single Soviet soldier could trigger the massacre of an entire village. "Over there it seemed right, here it horrifies me. I remember one little girl lying in the dust like a broken doll with no arms or legs..."

An artillery captain avers that serving in Afghanistan was the happiest time of his life. "We'll never walk, or make love, or be loved, the way we walked and loved and were loved over there." He calls his homesickness for the war "the Afghan syndrome." It was only when he returned home, he says, that his troubles began. To get on the plane from Tashkent to Sverdlovsk to be with his wife cost him in bribes 100 rubles, plus a pair of Italian sunglasses, a Japanese scarf and a French make-up kit, all purchased in Kabul on the black market, and 40 foreign currency vouchers from his army pay. The hashish he smoked over there helped him get by, he writes. And what did he learn, other than nostalgia for the war? "You go to war in order to kill. Killing is my profession—that's what I was trained to do."

Most poignant of all are the stories of the widows and mothers, their losses made all the more grievous by disillusion about the war itself and the nation-state, the "Motherland," that chose to fight it. Tamara Dovnar, left with a young daughter when her first lieutenant husband died in battle, reports how her husband's body was sent home to her. She, her child and her husband's family waited at Minsk for two days before being told the body had been sent to Baranovich, a hundred kilometers away, by mistake. "You can come and fetch it yourselves," the local military authorities told them. When they finally reached Baranovich Airport, the place was closed, dark. They searched out a watchman who told them, "There's a crate of some sort over there. Go and have a look at it."

If it's yours you can take it."

"We found a dirty box lying on the airfield, with '1st Lieutenant Dovnar' scrawled over it in chalk," she said. "I tore open a board where the little window was let into the side of the coffin. His face was uninjured but he was unshaven, he hadn't been washed and the coffin was too short. And the smell... I couldn't bend down and kiss him. That's how my husband was returned to me."

In many voices, "Zinky Boys" reminds us of the unbearable truths war teaches: that there are martyrs on both sides, even in the most unjust of wars; that there are victims far from the battlefields, whose suffering goes on long after the last shot is fired; and that *Realpolitik* close up resembles nothing more than a slaughterhouse. This is an important book, in a class with Orwell's "Homage to Catalonia," Michael Herr's "Dispatches" and Mike Martin's "Afghanistan: Inside a Rebel Stronghold."

*The reviewer is the author of "Night Letters," a book about the war in Afghanistan.*

THE WASHINGTON POST

DECEMBER 15, 1992

## Amir Humza, 42, Dies; Afghan Vice President

PESHAWAR, Pakistan, Jan. 13 (AP) — Amir Humza, a Vice President of Afghanistan, died on Tuesday, a day after he was flown to Pakistan for emergency medical treatment. He was 42.

Mr. Humza died of a brain hemorrhage, doctors said. He had been unconscious for two days.

When he was brought to Pakistan, Afghan Government officials said Mr. Humza would be treated for a heart ailment. But Afghans had said the Vice President was critically wounded in a weekend rocket attack on the capital, Kabul, by rebels trying to unseat the Islamic Government.

During the 14-year war against the Soviet occupation forces and the former Communist Government in Kabul, Mr. Humza fought with Muslim rebels belonging to a faction called the Jamiat-i-Islami, which is led by Burhanuddin Rabbani.

After the collapse of Communist rule in April, Mr. Rabbani was named interim President and appointed Mr. Humza a Vice President despite opposition from other factions.

NYT 1/14

# Afghanistan — a scene blurred by mistakes

IN 1932 Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung, in his address at a public meeting in Delhi, paid tributes to Amanullah Khan, the deposed Afghan ruler. He was speaking on the wave of awakening in the Muslims countries of Asia.

Afghanistan, he said, was a poor country but the effort to introduce and promote modern education by Amanullah was highly laudable. He added that of the two new higher educational institutions Italian was made the medium of instruction in one and French in the other. (An English-medium college had already been established by his predecessor).

Afghanistan signed agreements with Germany, Holland, France and Switzerland under which Afghan students were encouraged to join higher educational institutions of those countries. Amanullah wished to educate his nation within the shortest possible time. He introduced compulsory education but that was premature. There were no trained teachers; so the compulsory education forced the children to go to the mullahs, who were arch enemies of Amanullah. Consequently these compulsory education centres proved the nurseries of anti-Amanullah campaign which ultimately brought his downfall. Whatever he had given to the country in the form of libraries, science laboratories and educational institutions was destroyed.

Ghazi Amanullah was not only the target of mullahs and Afghan reactionaries but the British were also very keen to get rid of the hostile Afghan king.

Ahmad Shuja Pasha, a prominent writer and journalist, published a book in 1989 on Afghanistan entitled *Afghanistan — Targedy of a Nation* in which he said: "Noor Mohammad Tarakai had to face about two-and-a-half lakh mullahs spread all over the country."

When Sardar Daud Khan deposed King Zahir Shah and declared his intent to introduce democratic system in Afghanistan, the young religious zealots like Engineer Gulbuddin Hikmatyar stood up against him. To avoid the crackdown Hikmatyar, Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani, Gulab Khan Ningharhi and other religious leaders and scholars migrated to Pakistan and some to Western countries. That was

Z.A. Bhutto's period. According to Gen. Naserullah Khan Babur, former Governor of the NWFP (quoted by Mustafa Kamal Pasha in *Fateh-i-Afghanistan*), "Z.A. Bhutto used these so-called fundamentalists against Sardar Daud. They were financed, trained and armed by the Pakistan Government, much before the 1978 Socialist revolution. One can easily say after going through the chapter *Bhutto-Hikmatyar Talsuqat Ki Haseeqat* that fundamentalists were used to politically destabilize Afghanistan on each turning-point in the history of that land.

About the recent happenings Molly Moore writes in the *Gulf Weekly* (27th August 1992): "But four months after a Mujahideen government took over from the collapsed authority of President Najibullah, the exchange of destruction among Afghanistan's ethnic and religious militia continues. And now it is Kabul's turn... For faction of the Mujahideen, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar has levellied entire blocks of Kabul with artillery and rockets in an assault more violent than any on Kabul during the Mujahideen's war against the former Communists and their Soviet army backers. An estimated 1,400 people have been killed or wounded in the past two weeks."

One may not feel the need to assess the so-called jihads against Amanullah Khan, Zahir Shah or Sardar Daud, but about the recent jihad Brig. Yusef writes in his book *The Bear Trap* (recently translated into Urdu as *Shikast-i-Rooz*) "I feel the fundamentalists were correct in their assessment of American motives, but foolish to make their opinion so obvious, as without full U.S. support the jihad did not and still cannot succeed."

Who knows mullahs against Amanullah were primarily coaxed by the British. They do not feel shy to fight a "sacred war" against their own brothers-in-faith with the help, assistance, and finances of non-Muslim governments and agencies.

And the same writer gives this verdict about the main architect of this jihad: "With a military triumph, Akhtar would be the hero: he had first advocated fighting, and he had devised and overseen the strategy of the war. It would be this victory. I be-

lieve that President Zia promoted Gen. Akhtar so that the credit would be his — Zia's. It would strengthen his personal authority and prestige enormously. He would be seen as the victor in the greatest jihad for centuries and it would surely have made his position as President unassailable.

Brig. Yusef, Haroon Rashad had even Mustafa Kamal Pasha have in their books — all published by Jang Publishers — made Akhtar Abdul Rahman as the hero of the Afghan war while Zia has been portrayed as a villain who snatched this victory with, of course, ulterior motives.

At a recent Lahore function where a book by a new woman writer Tehmina Sher Durrani (of course not Tehmina Durrani of *My Feudal Lord* fame on Zia-ul-Haq was launched, the chief guest, Ejaz-ul-Haq, Federal Minister and son of the late Gen. Zia-ul-Haq said that he had not read the books in which Gen. Akhtar Abdul Rahman had been made hero of the Afghan war.

The same day there was a news about the American Ambassador in Pakistan. He said that the American administration had urged the commanders of the Afghan jihad to return the armaments given to them to fight against the Soviet forces and their agents in Kabul. Now is it not surprising that the new book on Afghanistan by Mustafa Pasha is not only in favour of Gen. Akhtar and against Gen. Zia but it also goes beyond that and proves that Z.A. Bhutto had financed, trained, and encouraged the Afghan commanders who were the backbone of Afghan resistance from 1979 to 1992. This book has been dedicated to Akhtar Abdul Rahman though his name has not been mentioned. Pasha is all praise for the qualities which the Afghan people have inherited from their ancestors but admits that before 1938 there was no country with the name of Afghanistan. This region remained under the command of the rulers having seats in adjacent countries like Pakistan, India and Iran. Kabul was part of the Indian empire from Babur to Shah Alam.

Before the first-ever Afghan ruler, Ahmad Shah Abdali, the area was occupied by Nadir Shah who went attacking the

Subcontinent to loot the wealth amassed by the Mughal rulers. In a letter to Mohammad Shah, the Mughal king, he wrote: "Be it clear to the enlightened mind of Your High Majesty that my coming to Kabul and possessing myself thereof was purely out of zeal for Islam and friendship for you. I never could have imagined that the wretches of the Dakkan could have imposed tributes on the dominions of the King of the Muslims. My stay on this side of stake is with a view that when those infidels move towards Hindostan, I may send an army of victorious Kizilbashs to drive them to the abysses of hell" (*History of the Punjab* by Syad Mohammad Latief, p. 200).

This "zeal for Islam" no doubt drove the Muslim ruler of Delhi to the abyss of hell. That was done both by Nadir Shah's Kizilbashs and Ahmad Shah Abdali's Afghans.

What made Afghanistan important was the rivalry among the European colonial powers trying to overpower the Eastern countries destabilized by stagnant political and economic systems. On one side, there was the Czar of Russia occupying a huge chunk of Central Asia, a predominantly Muslim region. On the other

side were the British which had taken full control of the areas now comprising Pakistan. These two big powers agreed to have Afghanistan as no-man's land. Afghanistan was and is basically a tribal society with pastoral and agricultural background. It did not fit in the semi-democratic British or Russian patterns. The deterring factor for both the powers was not the superiority of strength of Afghanistan which is divided into more than eight ethnic and linguistic groups, such as Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, etc. The map of Afghanistan shows the distribution of major ethnic groups. There are more than 121 tribes and sub-nationalities, and Mustafa-Kamal Pasha says: "Afghanistan is neither a linguistic unit nor a nation having a common culture." There has always been a lot of confusion in Afghanistan and Pasha's book gives a clear indication to that.

Two chapters of the book are very clear and readable. One is "God's Soldier — Christic Character of Gen. Akhtar in Jihad-i-Afghanistan" and the other is "Disputed General of Afghan Jihad — said and Unsaid Matters about Gen. Hameed Gul."

Gen. Akhtar is no doubt the

hero of this book. He was denied the credit of victory and the man who replaced him and miserably failed, is Gen. Hameed Gul — painted as the nominee of Junjo and not of Zia. We know only one Gen. Akhtar — Gen. Akhtar Husain Malik of Chhamb fame (1965) who had the reputation of a good soldier. What merits Gen. Akhtar Abdul Rahman as a soldier has is not widely known even in the Pakistan Army except that he participated in the 1965 war as a major without getting his name mentioned in the "despatches." So one cannot be clear how Gen. Akhtar fared in this irregular war or regular wars of 1947, 1965 and 1971. On the other hand, Maj.-Gen. Hameed Gul had much better reputation, mainly based on his excellent performance in "house taste."

Gen. Gul Hameed as a replacement of Gen. Akhtar in ISI can never be liked by the pro-Akhtar writers (including Pasha). Consequently, Gen. Hameed Gul is accused of converting the jihad of Afghanistan into a political movement, sabotaging the military victory of Afghanistan, the Ojibi camp tragedy and the defeat at Jalelabad during Benazir Bhutto's Prime Ministership. Gen. Akhtar fully supported the political and all other moves of Gen. Zia. He also helped establish Zia's image. But all was done behind the scenes. He was never seen in the front row or on the stage. He might have corrupted a lot of Pakistani journalists by ISI money but he avoided publicity. When he was told to relinquish the charge of ISI, he made no protest as Gen. Gen. Hameed Gul did when he was asked to join the Taxila Heavy Mechanical Complex. That he took as below his dignity. But what is his dignity or reputation? He fought only one battle in Jalelabad about which Brig. Yousef says in an interview to the *News*: "The Mujahideen tried to capture Jalelabad by conventional means, which was a change from their previous tactics which had proved very successful in attacking an enemy superior in numbers by 3 to 1 and with far greater firepower as well. Thus the Mujahideen never stood a chance."

The Jalelabad operation was Gen. Hameed Gul's brainchild. However, after the failure of this misplaced adventure he said that he was not in favour of this attack but Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister had forced him to go ahead. Pasha questions the integrity of Gen. Hameed Gul and remarks that if he can say "no" to the present C-in-C and gets

retirement, he could easily have said "no" Gen. Bag who must have communicated Benazir's wish to him.

Pasha points out another contradiction with special reference to the formation of Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad. Gen. Hameed Gul claims the credit of forming IJI in 1988 to forestall the victory of the Pakistan Peoples Party. If that is correct, and one tends to believe it is correct, then Gen. Hameed Gul could never have been sincere to Benazir's government. He must have been working for bringing it down, and for that purpose the Jalelabad operation was not a bad choice.

The Jalelabad operation is not that controversial or consequential. More important is the controversy over the Afghan operation. Pasha writes this supposition is totally wrong that Zia-ul-Haq framed the policy about Afghanistan and Gen. Akhtar Abdul Rahman implemented it. The real architect of the policy of military confrontation with Russia and Afghan armies was Akhtar Abdul Rahman and he himself successfully implemented it.

It may not be proper here to mention the social, political and economic damages earned by Pakistan after its active involvement in Afghan affairs. Anyhow, heroin, illegal arms, deforestation in the NWFP area where refugees have been kept smuggling and other allied political and economic problems cannot be ignored.

But there are other, much more important, factors. All the Islamic groups and parties are not clear what to do with a free Afghanistan. They have no idea of alternative "State arrangements." Therefore they are now at each other's throat. Their ideology's hold on them is not so strong as to bring them under one banner.

They were first encouraged, financed and trained by Z.A. Bhutto to fight against Daud. Later on their control was taken over by the succeeding Pakistan government and the whole of the West which was jointly struggling against communism.

Afghanistan has no deep foundations of statehood. There was only one binding force in the shape of a family to which belongs King Zahir Shah. Zahir Shah's removal created the basic void. Daud was a member of the same royal family and was thus acceptable to the people. After his murder there was — and still there is — no chance of peaceful transfer of power and political stabilization. Islam is no more a binding

force between different ethnic and regional groups. We Pakistanis, are perhaps in a better position to understand this situation: Islam could not keep the two wings of Pakistan united.

Mustafa Kamal Pasha writes: Victory in Afghanistan is a dream turned into confusing interpretations. Our own foolishness, coupled with the enemy's moves, has blurred the whole scene."

SHAFQAT TANVIR MIRZA  
PT Magazine Section  
11/6

## Afghans observe black day

PT 12/28

PESHAWAR, Dec. 27: The Afghan Mujahideen and refugees throughout their camps observed black day today to condemn the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, reports Afghan News Agency.

This is the blackest day in the history of Afghanistan when on this day the Red Army of the former Soviet Union trampled under foot the sacred soil of Afghanistan and installed Babrak Karmal by removing Hafizullah Amin in a military coup.

Rallies were held and seminars held at different refugee camps in NWFP to mark the day.

One such meeting was held at the Shamshat refugees camp under the auspices of Hezb-i-Islami which was addressed by the deputy leader of HIA, Qazi Mohammad Amin Waqad, director information of HIA, Diljo Husaini and prominent Afghan scholar Maulvi Mahmoodul Hassan.

The speakers threw light on the decade-long struggle of the Afghan people against the clutches of communism in the wake of which 17 lakh Afghans laid down their lives, 2,00,000 were maimed and crippled, 2.5 million children

orphaned and lakhs of women widowed.

One third of the population forced to migrate to the neighbouring countries while another one third displaced internally due to heavy bombardment of the puppet regime forces and their Soviet masters.

Qazi Mohammad Amin reminded that the former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in a bid to submerge it in the grand Russian empire and their leaders never thought that they would face a shameful retreat. He highly eulogised the sacrifices of the Afghan masses in restoring the freedom, non-aligned status and Islamic character of Afghanistan.

Qazi Waqad on this occasion reminded the audience of the plight of Muslims all over the globe especially in Kashmir, India, Palestine, Bosnia, Tajikistan and a number of other countries and said that the suppressed Muslims were today looking for the help of their Afghan brethren.

Therefore, the Afghans should come up to this occasion and not only restore peace in Afghanistan but also extend physical support to the oppressed Muslims — PPI.

## Kabul amends citizenship law

To encourage Afghans living in exile to return, the Islamic government is studying the possibility of allowing dual citizenship for Afghans.

Such a decision would require legislation because Afghanistan's laws do not permit its nationals to have citizenship in another country.

A considerable number of Afghans, some of whom are doctors, engineers or have other crucial skills, took refuge in other countries during the Soviet occupation of

Afghanistan. Some of these Afghans have accepted citizenship in their host countries. Their return to Afghanistan to help the reconstruction of Afghanistan is considered necessary.

During the last two years of his rule, Najib had issued a decree allowing Afghans living in exile to get Afghan passports without affecting their status in the country they live in.

PT MAGAZINE 10/15

# REFUGEES FLEEING TAJIKISTAN STRIFE

By EDWARD A. GARGAN  
Special to The New York Times

**MAZAR-I-SHARIF, Afghanistan,** Jan. 13 — Pursued by helicopters, armored vehicles and soldiers of the newly victorious Communist Government in Tajikistan, the eight members of the Khatobg family, along with thousands of their Muslim compatriots, fled south last week, toward the Amu Darya River, toward Afghanistan, toward refuge.

But the family never reached safe haven. "They disappeared," recalled Khoshmurat Karimot, his words coming slowly, clumsily, "they went into the water. They were swept away. The soldiers were shooting at us as we went over in the night. They just disappeared."

In the last two months, as civil war has engulfed the Central Asian republic of Tajikistan, tens of thousands of Tajik Muslims have been driven from their farms and their towns by resurgent Communist armies intent on suppressing Islamic political power. Fleeing for their lives, many have crossed the swift-flowing Amu Darya on precarious rafts, tiny boats or simply by swimming. The unfortunate never make it; the flight of the lucky ones ends here in the mushrooming refugee encampments that spread near this town in northern Afghanistan.

After decades of religious repression under the former Soviet Union, freedom brought an explosion of Islamic consciousness in Tajikistan, fueled by the long-underground Islamic Renaissance Party, which began agitating for a state based on Koranic principles.

## Civil War Erupts

Since last June, a battle of wills that quickly turned to a battle of guns has spread in Tajikistan, pitting aspiring Islamic political forces against Communist loyalists. Last autumn a short-lived coalition among the old regime, Islamic fundamentalists and fledgling democrats dissolved in mistrust, clan rivalries and worldism, plunging the republic into civil war.

Last month, after Ali Rakhmanov, a hard-line Communist, was elected president, Tajik Communist troops supported by forces from Uzbekistan, another Central Asian republic headed by former Communists, stormed into the capital, Dushanbe, killing many militant Muslims and driving tens of thousands south toward Afghanistan.

"I supported the Islamic Party," said Mr. Karimot, whose gaunt, weathered face was softened by a combed white beard. "I left my village when the soldiers came, but could not fight because I had no guns. I want an Islamic Government because we must get rid of Communism. Because of Communism we left Tajikistan."

He stood among a clot of fellow Tajiks, on the edge of a sea of tents covered in blue plastic that stretch across a treeless, windswept and frigid plain 30 miles south of the Amu Darya.

Today, they are one of more than 100,000 Tajik Muslims who have sought safety by fleeing to Afghanistan, itself crippled by 14 years of warfare.

"We've had two waves of refugees arrive in northern Afghanistan," said Roger Vivarié, an official with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, one of the international agencies attempting to help the Tajik refugees. "When you have 50,000, 100,000 refugees arriving in a country torn by war, you cannot expect to have the best facilities."

"A lot of people who arrived were wounded," he continued. "How many people died crossing the river, we don't know. People have to cross heavy barbed wire and then cross the river."

Some of those who are fleeing Tajikistan are Islamic fighters, retreating under the onslaught of Communist armies. As they cross the river, local Afghan commanders are disarming the guerrillas and sending them on to the refugee centers.

In two hastily erected camps east of Mazar-i-Sharif, and in the town of Kunduz, Tajik refugees are being sheltered from biting cold, snow and rain.

A woman named Sabuhan, her head swathed in a brilliant blue-and-yellow scarf, emerged from a tent and rubbed her hands together briskly against the biting cold. Her mother, Samangul, stirred globs of fat in a pan over a fire fueled by a jumble of thick twigs.

## Crossing River Under Fire

"We came from Sartzy," she said, naming a town about 30 miles north of the border post of Qalayi Zal. "We left about two months ago and went to the river. We tied inner tubes together and put boards on top of them. But when we crossed, they were shooting at us and some children were killed."

Day by day, the camp here is growing, with new ranks of blue-covered tents springing up. Steadily, the Tajiks are digging underground bunkers, not for protection from war, but for warmth. There is virtually no wood to burn for heat, and what twigs are available are used for cooking.

Although the refugees here and in Kunduz, have fled because they are regarded as Islamic militants by the pro-Communist forces that control much of Tajikistan, the people here scarcely resemble Afghanistan's rigid fundamentalists.

Tajik women wear head scarves, but shun chadors, the head-to-toe covering worn by women in the most conservative Islamic societies. Tajik women also do not hesitate to contradict men in public and are vigorous in expressing their views. Many of the women here held jobs in Tajikistan, in sharp contrast to the situation of women in strict Muslim countries, who usually remain at home.

Because they have not been able to gain access to Tajikistan for two months, United Nations officials are uncertain how many people are trying to flee the country. In November, however, Nasir Momeni, an official with Unicef, traveled through parts of Tajikistan and estimated that as many as 380,000 people were displaced by the

civil war in the area south of Dushanbe. The officials are not optimistic that the 110,000 Tajik refugees now estimated to be in northern Afghanistan will return home soon. "As long as the political situation is not dealt with," said Mr. Momeni, "this is going to be a permanent refugee problem."

## Islam in Central Asia

To the Editor:

I am dismayed by the constant refrain of the great danger that Iran and Islam pose for the world, especially now in articles on Afghanistan and Central Asia, particularly Tajikistan. Having lived for years in all of these countries, I believe that neither the peoples nor the governments wish to spread their influence or that of Islam. What they want, above all, is peace and stability, and Shiite Persians are not about to convert Sunni Muslims in Central Asia.

Of course, there are fanatics, political as well as religious, everywhere, and we must all resist these enemies of mankind. Fear of such fanatics paralyzes governments and decent people, and this vicious influence must be opposed, it may be hoped by the United Nations. But rather than indict Muslims or Iranians, we should cooperate in facing the serious economic and environmental problems that beset us all.

In Central Asia, the South Koreans and Japanese should take the lead in giving economic aid through investments, but they should follow the Israelis, who not only invest in supplying the best cotton seeds to a project in the Ferghana Valley, but then also supply everything needed to produce cloth and then clothes that will sell on the world market.

Only this method, from seed to finished product, will work in that part of the world.

RICHARD N. FRYE

Brimfield, Mass., Nov. 14, 1992

The writer is emeritus professor of Iranian studies, Harvard University.



The New York Times



# CHRONOLOGY

10/23 - Frontier Post - The chief of Daye Ittehad-i-Islami Afghanistan, Qazi Moh'd Amin Waqad, announced the merger of his party with Hizb-i-Islami Afghanistan (Gulbuddin). The News (Pakistan) reported that Waqad, "a moderate Mohmand from Nangrahar," broke with Hekmatvar in 1985.

At present Amin Waqad has sent his three members to the Jehadi council but he was not given berth in the leadership council. It is also said that the move on the part of Hizb-i-Islami might be to bring a change in its ~~hardline~~ <sup>policy</sup> as Amin Waqad has close relations with Iran and is on good terms with Professor Rabbani as well. Waqad it may be mentioned has also demanded dissolution of all the Afghan parties for he believed that none of these parties ~~met~~ <sup>met</sup> the basic requirements for being a political party. He may be appointed as the Naib Amir of Hizb-i-Islami. Hekmatvar sources informed.



Ali Akbar Velayati

11/4 - Frontier Post - Gen. Khan Moh'd, deputy minister for nat'l security (and former chief of the 1st unit of Khad), was killed in a car bomb blast yesterday in Kabul. - Earlier this week Mujaddadi & Hekmatyar met to discuss "important nat'l issues. The meeting carries great significance as in the past relations between the two leaders remained strained. A fast detente has now been noted between the two leaders."

11/13 - PT - A memo between Pakistan & Afghanistan was signed last July stipulating that Pakistan Railways, in association with Afghan engineers, would conduct a feasibility study for a rail link between Landi Kotal & Kabul. Also proposed was a railroad from Chaman to Hirat.

11/14 - NYT - Mujahideen from Afghanistan are among those Muslims who have volunteered to fight the Serbs in Bosnia.

11/15 - AFGHANews (Jamiat) - The telephone line between Jalalabad & Torkham was recently restored.

- About 3,000 Afghan Sikhs & Hindus, who fled after the rocket attacks on Kabul last August, have pitched tents near a temple in Delhi to protest the

lack of attention paid to them by the Indian Gov't.

- Saudi Arabia has reopened its Embassy in Kabul. (See p. 10.)

- Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati paid an official 1-day visit to Kabul 10/9.

He met with Rabbani & Gailani & assured them of Iran's support for Afghanistan's membership in the Economic Cooperation Organization. (Other members are Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan & Kazakhstan.) Velayati invited Gailani to visit Iran; the invitation was accepted.

- Asbury Park Press - Rebels shelled gov't troops guarding the southern edge of Kabul yesterday in their fiercest attack since the August cease-fire.

11/18 - AFGHANews (12/1) - Gen. Dostum led a 50-member delegation on a religious pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. It was a private visit but Dostum met with the head of Saudi intelligence. Pakistan reportedly arranged the invitation & Dostum considers it a sign of good will toward his Nat'l Islamic Movement.

11/24 - KT - Rabbani appointed Gulabuddin Shirzai President of the Chamber of Commerce & Industries of Afghanistan & Ustad Rabbani Razmoh'd Lawani Head of Nat'l Security in Ghazni Province.

11/21 - PT - Gailani announced his candidacy in the upcoming Afghan presidential election.

- Over 1m refugees have returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan since the inception of the Islamic Gov't.

11/25 - PT - Iona Androv, a member of the Russian Federation, met with Rabbani in Kabul. They agreed on the resumption of relations between Afghanistan & the Russian Federation.

- Afghan Army Chief of Staff Wardak arrived in Rawalpindi to visit military establishments in Pakistan. (See related article on p. 9.)

11/26 - PT - Mujahideen from NIFA (Mojadeddi) cut the last power line to Kabul last week. NIFA fighters said they had not been paid for a long time & would restore power only when their demands to be recognized as the official security force for the line were met. If the Gov't won't "accept the idea of a security force, then the electricity will be finished for the winter," said a spokesman.

11/30 - PT - The UN will begin repatriating Afghan refugees from Iran. Returnees will receive \$25 & 110 lbs. of food. By the end of the year, over 520,000 refugees are expected to return; over 300,000 already have.

12/1 - PT - Iran will continue to send humanitarian relief to Afghanistan. So far 1425 tons of goods have been airlifted to Kabul; 3150 tons have been sent by truck.

- Fighting broke out in Farah Prov. between Harakat Inqilabi (Mohammadi) & Hezb-e-Wahdat.

- AFGHANews - Dr. Sayyed Amir Shah Hasanyar was appointed the new Dean of Kabul University. However, due to lack of facilities, the University may not open until next year. A 17-member consultative commission made up of KU professors will advise the Gov't on economic, educational, reconstruction, foreign policy & management problems.

- Germany pledged DM 7m worth of emergency aid to Afghanistan, as well as forgiving the repayment of a DM 64m loan.

- On the upcoming elections:

According to the rules of the election, each district with a population of up to 30,000 will send two representatives to the Hal-o-Aqd Council. For each 18,000 extra population one additional representative is given to that district. Each sub-district with a population of up to 15,000 elects one representative. For each 18,000 extra population one additional representative will be chosen. The UN 1990 population survey was accepted as a base for the population of districts.

Here is the list of representatives that each province will send to the Hal-o-Aqd Council:

Ningarhar: 63, Herat: 54, Kandahar: 51, Ghazni: 48, Paktia: 44, Faryab: 41, Jawzjan: 40, Balkh: 38, Badakhshan: 37, Kunduz: 34, Takhar: 34, Helmand: 34, Parwan: 31, Urozgan: 30, Baghlan: 29, Farah: 27, Maidan: 24, Kapisa: 24, Bamyan: 20, Ghore: 20, Zabul: 17, Badghis: 17, Logar: 17, Laghman: 23, Kunar: 22, Samangan: 19, Nimroz: 9, and the city of Kabul: 50.

Five percent of the total will be selected by the president, and 15 percent by the Leadership Council. This will enable scholars and prominent refugees living in exile to attend the Hal-o-Aqd meetings. Invitation letters have already been sent to these people.

The UN and OIC were asked to send observers to the Hal-o-Aqd proceedings, but so far they have not given a positive response.

12/2 - WSJ - The CIA has been financing a US buyback of missiles used in Afghanistan at immensely inflated prices (see p. 8).

12/4 - PT - Hizb-e-Islami (Gulbuddin) is ready to help Rabbani set up a gov't, according to Radio Tehran.

12/6 - PT - The chief of the official bank of Afghanistan, Ghulam Moh'd, announced that a system of Islamic banking in line with the Shariah would be introduced in Afghanistan. He added that the bank will fix a realistic exchange rate to make imports competitive.

- UN Sec'y Gen'l Boutros Ghali called for the release of all POWs of the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Ghali said a number of POWs are still being held by various Afghan groups.

12/7 - NYT - Rockets & artillery shells exploded across Kabul yesterday in a new round of combat between Hezb-i-Wahadat & Masood's Shura-e-Nazar.

Hezb-i-Wahadat represents the Hazaras, the minority Shiites who are concentrated in the most impoverished and neglected regions of central Afghanistan. Although a census has not been done in years, the Hazaras are believed to make up about 10 percent of Afghanistan's population.

Hezb-i-Wahadat, a coalition of eight small parties financed and well armed by Iran, is demanding a greater role for Shiites in future governments.





12/10 - PT - Dostum's forces took control of strategic state installations after "the war machine of Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Masood's Shoor-i-Dazar was destroyed by both Hezb-i-Wahdat & militia forces." Unconfirmed reports said Masood was captured.

12/11 - PT - An agreement between the Dostum forces & the Gov't was reached. - NYT - Militant Tajik refugees backed by Afghan fighters clashed on the Afghan frontier with troops loyal to ousted Tajikistan president Nabyev. Over 35,000 Tajik refugees have reached Afghanistan, according to UNHCR. About 5,000/day cross the Amu Darya on rafts made of wood & oil drums.



12/14 - PT - Rabbani said he would step down only when a national assembly meets to choose his successor. Reportedly, rumors that he might not step down are what triggered the fighting between Gov't forces & Dostum's militia.

12/17 - PT - The severe fighting between Masood's forces & Hizb-i-Wahdat was thought to be a planned conspiracy to delay the Shoor-i-Dazar. The Gov't said it was because Hezb-i-Wahdat didn't stand a chance of winning the presidential election. The "man in the street of Kabul City was indifferent as to who should be the President of Afghanistan. He is only interested in the one who could bring peace to the city & restore the supply of electricity, water & telephone connections as they badly hit by the scarcity of these facilities for the last 10 days."

12/19 - PT - An Afghan military plane airlifted a number of 2nd & 3rd line Afghan leaders to Kabul for the upcoming Shoor-i-Dazar. The plane brought Ayatullah

Mohsini to Kabul from Peshawar where he had been having a medical checkup. However, no one seems quite sure when the Shoor-i-Dazar will take place; some say tomorrow.

12/20 - PT - The Shoor-i-Dazar opened yesterday. About 600 people attended the opening ceremony at the Intercontinental Hotel. Organizer Sayyad Nurullah Imad said, "We didn't invite the Mujahideen party leaders because this is just an introductory session." The paper noted that the session "was concluded when some unpleasant situation was about to arise."

12/21 - NYT - Egyptian, Algerian & Saudi intelligence services allege that a large number of the skilled Muslim guerrillas waging bloody campaigns in Algeria, Egypt & Tunisia were trained in Afghanistan in the 1980s by Iranian agents.

12/28 - WSJ - UN officials told Afghanistan's feuding leaders to settle their differences or risk losing int'l aid. (See p. 11).

12/28 - PT - The Shoor-i-Ahl-Haq-o-Aqd met at 10:30 a.m. at the "Continental Hotel" to choose the future leadership of Afghanistan.

12/31 - WP - The Nat'l Council for Resolution & Settlement voted to keep Rabbani in power for another 18 months. The vote was 916 to 59 with 360 abstentions. (See p. 6). Yunis Khalis & Gailani dropped out of the race & boycotted the assembly, accusing the Rabbani faction of buying votes.

- LAT - Rabbani's administration will spend the next 18 months drafting a new constitution & preparing for nation-wide elections in mid-1984.



1/3 - NYT - Rabbani appealed for support after he was sworn in for a 2-year term (see p. 6).

Continued on p. 7.

# Afghan Leader, Sworn In, Appeals for Unity

THE NEW YORK TIMES  
JANUARY 3, 1993

KABUL, Afghanistan, Jan. 2 (Reuters) — Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was elected President this week in a vote boycotted by several factions, appealed to his opponents to support him today as he was sworn in to a two-year term.

Five of the nine Muslim factions on the country's divided leadership council boycotted the special assembly that elected him on Wednesday. They accused Mr. Rabbani, who has been Afghanistan's Acting President since June, of bribing some of the delegates so he could remain in power.

In a speech, President Rabbani described those drawing battle lines

against his Islamic Government as heretics but appealed to them to bow to what he called the "nation's will and decision."

The official Kabul Radio said the assembly that elected Mr. Rabbani had also approved the creation of a parliament, set up an army and ordered the television and radio to abide by Islamic tenets.

## Parliament to Be Formed

The assembly voted on Friday to form a parliament from the ranks of its 1,335 members, according to the radio report, which was monitored in Islamabad today. The assembly is made up

of scholars, clerics and representatives of clans and other communities across Afghanistan.

Mr. Rabbani seems to have obtained the backing of more groups over the last few days, including that of a powerful militia commander, Abdul Rashid Dostam, and that of the Hezbi-Islami faction led by Mohammad Yunis Khalis.

But the militarily powerful Hezbi-Islami party that is led by the hard-line Muslim leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has so far shown no sign of compromise. His forces, which have repeatedly skirmished with Government troops in recent months, are stationed outside

Kabul. Mr. Rabbani bid farewell today to his the Jamiat-Islami party, which he has led for the last two decades.

"From now on I do not belong to any party but to the people of Afghanistan," he said in his speech delivered in the Pashtu and Dari languages.

Jamiat is a main faction in the Muslim rebel coalition that overthrew the former Soviet-backed Government in April after 14 years of civil war. There was no immediate word of who would take over as leader of the faction.

## THE MINISTERS IN THE RABBANI GOVERNMENT

(Reuters telex, 12/30/92)

(Elected 30 Dec 92 for a two-year term)

Vice-president.....Maulvi Mir HAMZA

[died 1/12 See p.33]

TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION (Formed 5 May 92)

Prime Minister.....Ustad FARID (Khalis)

(Took up appointment 6 Jul 92)

## MINISTERS:

Border Affairs.....Abdul Ahad KARZAI (ANLF)  
Chief of Army Staff.....Gen Rahim WARDAK (NIFA)  
City Planning.....Abdul Hafiz BEG (NIFA)  
Commerce.....Ahmad Zai SHAHBAZ (Harakat)  
Communications.....Engineer AKRAM (NIFA)  
Construction.....Zemarak YASSER (Ittehad)  
Defence.....Gen Ahmad Shah MASOOD (Jamiat)  
Finance.....Gen Hamidullah RAHIMI (ANLF)  
Food Supply.....Sayed Ishaq GAILANI (ANLF)  
Foreign Affairs.....Sayed Solaiman GAILANI (NIFA)  
Health.....Najibullah MOJADIDI (ANLF)  
Higher Education.....Musa TAWANA (JAMIAT)  
Interior.....Ahmad SHAH (Ittehad)  
Islamic Affairs.....Arsala RAHMANI (Ittehad)  
Justice.....Jalaluddin HAQQANI (Khalis)  
Kabul Governor.....Mohammad Musa KHALIQI (Harakat)  
National Security.....Gen Yahya NAWROZ (Ind)  
Orphans and Disabled.....ANWAR KHAN (Jamiat)  
Police.....ABDUL HAQ (Khalis)  
Refugee Return.....Gen Rahmatullah SAFI (Khalis)  
Rural Development.....Zabullah HADI  
Small Industry and Food.....Soliman YARI (ANLF)  
Social Services.....Abdul MANAN  
Water and Power.....Shahroolah GERAN (NIFA)

## FULL NAME OF PARTIES:

Harakat-Inqilab-i-Islami (Harakat)  
Hezbe-i-Islami (Khalis) - (Khalis)  
National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA)  
Ittehad-i-Islami (Ittehad)  
Afghan National Liberation Front (ANLF)  
Jamiat-i-Islami (Jamiat)

President of the Afghanistan Bank

(Central Bank).....Mohammad KABIR

Also from a 12/30  
Reuters telex:

Chief Justice Maulvi Moh'd Fazeli told reporters, "Prof. Rabbani is the first elected mujahideen leader of the Islamic revolutionary state of Afghanistan."

Delegates were allowed to cast their ballots only in a single blue box marked with Rabbani's picture. Another similar box was removed when no other candidate was proposed.

"I voted for Rabbani, but I'm not sure what will happen in the future," one delegate said after the voting.

Parliament will be formed from among 20% of the 1,335 delegates to the electoral assembly.

# Iran helps Kabul in banking field

**Ghulam Mohammad Yelaqi**, the Governor of Afghan Central Bank, met with his Iranian counterpart, **Mohammad Husain Adeli**, on October 25 and discussed with him expansion of bilateral banking relations.

Yelaqi expressed interest in establishing banking relations with Iran.

Outlining objectives of Islamic banking system, Adeli declared Tehran's readiness to establish finan-

cial and banking cooperation with Kabul.

Afghan trade officials were also present in the meeting.

Yelaqi described his talks with Iran's banking and economic officials as "positive". He added that according to agreements reached, personnel of the Afghan banks will be trained in Iran.

In continuation of Iran's relief aid to the Afghan people, three C-130 planes carrying relief aid landed on

October 12 at Kabul International airport.

The aid, including 50 tonnes of foodstuff and medicine, was handed to the Afghan Islamic government.

Iran has sent more than 1300 tons of foodstuff to Afghanistan by 90 C-130 planes over the past six months, in addition to other aid despatched to western provinces of Afghanistan by land.

The Islamic Republic of Iran donated radio equipment worth of \$100,000 to Afghan Radio and TV on October 25. The package included some books and films for TV use.

## Afghanistan

### Woes of winter

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT IN KABUL

**T**HE first snow of the winter came to Kabul a month earlier than usual this year. It was not a heavy fall and soon melted. But now the streets have turned from dust to mud. Kabulis are that much more despondent as they slish around looking for work and scarcely affordable food and fuel.

The ones that are used to bake bread for the army and government staff closed down for several days in late November for lack of coal. Fuel for cooking, heating and transport costs as much as it did last winter—the equivalent of about \$3 a gallon for diesel, \$6 for petrol—when the former communist government was struggling to keep the roads open to bring supplies to the capital.

Keeping the roads open remains a problem. The former Afghan mujahideen guerrillas who fought the Soviet army and then the communist government are now in conflict with each other. The forces of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar blockaded all food and fuel from Pakistan bound for Kabul after they suffered a series of military defeats by the government earlier this year. They now allow private traders through on payment of a toll, as they did during the communist regime under President Najibullah. If the roads are closed again, the Kabulis who survive the winter will have the smugglers to thank, as they have in years past.

"How little things have changed," a senior official in the caretaker Islamic government reflected sadly. "It's just like it was under Najib." In some ways it is worse. The feeling of hope about the future that followed Mr Najibullah's fall in April has gone. The drop in morale can be measured by the sinking afghani. In April there were about 500 afghanis to the dollar. Now there are around 1,100. The communists had a

coupon system to buy food. When the caretaker government tried to revive it, issuing a month's supply of coupons, it proved valueless because there was no food in the subsidised shops. Now the government has given families a little cash to buy food within the markets.

Many Afghans have a vague idea that the United Nations should step in to try to solve their problems. The UN was running some humanitarian projects in Kabul, but its expatriate staff fled in August when the town was hit by Mr Hikmatyar's rockets. Nowadays the main humanitarian activity of its remaining Afghan staff is to look after Mr Najibullah and his entourage, who took refuge in a UN office when they could not escape from Kabul.

Such hope for peace in Afghanistan as there is may depend on whether a national assembly, the Council of Resolution and Settlement, can be convened in Kabul. Its first session has been repeatedly postponed, but might start on December 19th. Fierce fighting again broke out in Kabul on December 6th, this time between government forces and former communists, but had died down by December 11th. The government denied that there had been an attempted coup and said the clash was caused by a "misunderstanding". It was a misunderstanding that caused about 100 deaths.

AFGHANews November 15, 1992

CHRONOLOGY cont. from p. 5

1/4 - **LAT** - Religious & tribal leaders at the Shoorā banned all non-Muslim groups from Afghanistan. At the final session of the 5-day assembly, the group prepared to elect 20% of its delegates to form a new Afghan Parliament.

1/9 - **NYT** - Gen. Asif Nawaz, Pakistan Army Chief of Staff, died yesterday of a heart attack.

1/14 - **NYT** - More refugees fleeing political strife in Tajikistan are pouring into Afghanistan (see p. 36).

THE ECONOMIST DECEMBER 19TH 1992



# U.S. Buys Back Afghan Missiles At High Cost

By DAVID ROGERS  
And GERALD F. SEIB

**Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL**  
WASHINGTON — In a costly legacy of the Afghan war, the U.S. is paying immensely inflated prices to buy back sophisticated ground-to-air Stinger missiles that it provided guerrilla forces battling the Soviet army in the late 1980s.

The Central Intelligence Agency has been financing the purchases from its contingency fund for covert operations. But the practice raises questions about the prices paid and which Afghan factions are benefiting from the dollars generated by the sales.

Intelligence sources familiar with the program say the CIA has had to pay more than double the estimated \$20,000 cost of a single missile. And the Bush administration is now meeting resistance from lawmakers as it seeks to reprogram millions of dollars to continue the purchases.

The pending budget request is subject to approval from House and Senate Intelligence and Appropriations Committees overseeing CIA operations, and House Intelligence Chairman David McCurdy is demanding that limits be put on the prices to be paid. The Oklahoma Democrat was unavailable for comment yesterday, but his position has begun to win support from influential colleagues who together pose a major obstacle for the White House.

Critics of the program are sympathetic with the problem faced by the administration but argue that the U.S. makes itself subject to a bidding war with no clear end in sight. Even if half of the missiles are recovered, for example, the remainder pose as much a threat and would be worth

that much more to their owners if they chose to sell on the arms market.

From the outset, the decision to arm the Afghan resistance with ground-to-air Stingers was a sensitive one for the CIA. The weapons gave the guerrilla forces the capacity to bring down Soviet aircraft and move more freely against the occupying army. But intelligence officials have long worried that the missiles could become a problem for the U.S. if resold by tribal leaders to hostile governments or terrorists.

Less sophisticated weapons from the long war are currently being resold across the northern Afghan border to warring factions in neighboring Tajikistan. But under accords signed last year, the U.S. committed itself to try to recover the more threatening missiles from the Afghan leaders, who succeeded in toppling the Moscow-backed Kabul government last April.

That victory has been followed by bloody warfare among the major factions. Kabul and its new government have been under attack from forces aligned with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and one question raised by the CIA's policy is whether the purchases have served to provide funds to continue the war. Though regarded by many Afghans as the most radical of the guerrilla leaders, Hekmatyar was prominent among those who benefited from U.S. aid — and Stinger missiles — because of his close ties with Pakistan's intelligence services, who oversaw the covert program.

WSJ

12/2

## US war-wounded project completed

The American defence department has completed the project for the treatment of war-wounded Afghans, whose treatment was not possible in Pakistan.

Under the Afghan-war-wounded transportation and rehabilitation program, the US defence department provided treatment to some 1,200 critically injured Afghan young, old, women and children from March 1986 until 1992.

Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Great Britain cooperated in implementation of the program.

Majority of critically injured Afghan people, mostly young, were airlifted to sixteen countries of the world in the planes of American air force from Pakistan for treatment purpose.

AFCHANews 11/15

## Afghans arms permits to be cancelled after 31st

MURTAZA MALIK

PESHAWAR, Dec 13: The Afghans, mostly the resistance leaders and their bodyguards in NWFP, would not be allowed to carry arms after the last day of this year and all permits issued for the purpose would stand cancelled.

Official sources told The Muslim here today that the permits had been issued to the Afghans as a special case in view of the then situation which no more prevailed. It had therefore been decided not to validate the permits any more after December 31.

The sources pointed out that the practice to issue temporary permits had been introduced in the early eighties for the convenience of the Afghan leadership and also to eliminate the chances of the arms being carried by unauthorised persons.

Originally the number of permit holders exceeded two thousand but following the withdrawal of the Soviets and the consequent development, the number began dwindling. At the end of

the first phase of the cancellation, the number was reduced to 1800 while it was further cut by 550 or so early this year. The existing number of the permit holders was about 1250.

Some of the Afghans, entitled to carry arms had reportedly asked for further extension on the ground that the situation in Afghanistan was still fluid and the dust had not settled down. But that had not been accepted by the Pakistan authorities, who pointed out that the uncertainty was confined to Kabul and around while there was no such problem in the rest of the country and at least they could safely go to Jalalabad where there was absolute peace. The sources ruled out the possibility of further renewal of the permits beyond December 31 and said that the decision would cover all the holders without exception.

Asked about the arrest of some of the Afghans crossing over to Pakistan following the post-Peshawar accord events, the



sources said that the police had not been specifically directed to do so and it was entirely the police's own initiative. Many of those arrested, were later let off without any further proceedings. Bulk of those arriving, had not been touched

AFGHANews 12/1

## Herat's transitional administration

A new Transitional administration has been set up in Herat by the Mujahideen. Commander Ismail Khan has been appointed governor and commander of Army Corps No. 4. . . .



# Mujahideen being inducted into Afghan army

KABUL, Nov. 7: Chief of Staff of the Afghanistan Armed Forces, Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak, has said efforts were underway to reorganise the Afghan armed forces to carry out their internal duties besides playing a major role in keeping peace and security in the region.

In an interview with APP in his office here at Ministry of Defence today, Gen. Wardak said "very soon Afghan armed forces will be in a very good shape. We do not want that a vacuum of power be created which always imbalances the forces and creates problems in the areas. We do hope that we will have armed forces which will maintain balance of power in the region and that will help towards maintenance of peace in southwestern Asia."

He further said by now six months have passed when the Islamic government reached at the helm of affairs, however, due to interference in security and stability, the speed of reorganisation of armed forces had been hampered. "The security situation is improving everyday and we do believe that peace will prevail in war-torn Afghanistan which will help a lot in reorganising the armed forces of the country."

The Chief of Staff said "we are reorganising some of the old units by mixing the Mujahideen elements." The command of these old units will be given to the Mujahideen commanders, he added.

The General said still we are making use of technical capabilities of some of the old personnel in the army. They have been incorporated into the armed forces.

When asked whether he had any plan to disarm the Afghan Mujahideen, Gen. Wardak said "we have asked the Mujahideen to join the armed forces with their arms which is one of the causes for restructuring the units besides bringing back all the weapons which are in command of the Mujahideen." In some of the provinces, we have collected a lot of weapons and given those back to the armed forces, he added, at the beginning there was no such centralised command. So, with the passage of time we are establishing centralised command, he said.

he said delegations have been sent all over the country to reassess the situation of the armed forces and to see what sort of help will be needed and also to help the

reorganisation and restructuring of the Afghan armed forces."

When asked whether he would like to have a standing army like other countries or continue with the old system, the General said "at the moment we are analysing the possibilities of a standing army, however, there are different views on the subject. Most of the Mujahideen leaders are of the opinion that we should have a professional army like Pakistan. But it would depend on the future need and a lot of aspects especially the economy of the country would be kept in mind while dealing with such a question."

At the moment for the immediate and urgent need of the armed forces, he said "We have asked for volunteers to join the army and not for military conscript." In the long run, we could have a small mobile professional army and along with that some sort of national guard.

To a question, the Chief of Staff said response regarding volunteers was encouraging. "Once the security situation stabilises, I think we can reassess and we can go back to our old system." We do believe a corps of professionals will always be required specially in some technical branches." The requirement of a professional corps will always be there even if we go back to the conscription.

In reply to a question, what methods have been adopted for bringing back the weapons under the control of the armed forces, Gen. Wardak said "we have asked the volunteers to come with their weapons and the volunteers without weapons would not be allowed to join the army. Secondly, he said, we have units we are reorganising and one of the condition to reorganise the Unit is that unit should have all the weapons which it required."

To a question (about withdrawing weapons from Mujahideen) he said once we start reconstruction of our country, we can barter weapons with some other material like tractors. We will give them the construction material to build their houses or to do something in agriculture field in return they will give us their weapons, he suggested.

When asked to comment on the withdrawal of controversial militia, the General said "all the militia units have been dissolved and now they are part of the Afghan army." When asked why

they are withdrawing, he replied they are just going to their main base in the north. He further said they are not only Uzbeks but mixed tribes are in it, even Pushtun are in this militia.

To a question that the personnel of army are not well dressed, he said "we have every intention to improve their clothing and uniform."

When asked that Chief of Hezbe Islami Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is insisting on the complete withdrawal of Dostum Militia from Kabul, General Rahim Wardak said, "Mr. Gulbuddin is struggling for power." He further added "Every political leader struggled for power."

To a question, Gen. Rahim Wardak denied that Afghan army had been in complete disarray. There are certain provinces, where the Afghan army had not been much in disarray. They have not been affected by the change. The Afghan army with the collaboration of Afghan Mujahideen, managed to keep themselves organised and stable in certain provinces, Afghan Air Force had not been that much affected by the change. It (air/force) has been affected in a very small percentage.

When asked whether you had any plan to train your pilots, army cadets and senior officers in Pakistan, Gen. Wardak said as far as training is concerned, the Afghan Army has highly trained officers among the Mujahideen ranks who had a very long combat experience. At the moment we have no training problem, he said. To a supplementary, he said training of the personnel of Afghan army in Pakistan is under consideration.

To a question, he said the training of the Afghan military cadres in India, Russia and other socialist communist countries had been cut down substantially and added in the past only one per cent officers used to go to India for training.

To a question that General Dostum is raising a army corps of 53, 70 and 80 divisions, he said all these are very old divisions based in north of Afghanistan. He (Dostum) is not raising any new corps, he added.

In reply to question, he said Afghan people are fed up with the war, now they want peace and tranquility in Afghanistan.

To a question, he was optimistic that Shura Ahle-Hal-o-Aqd will provide a stable government to Afghanistan which will enjoy the backing of all Mujahideen groups.

## Afghan Factions

Afghanistan's civil war among former mujahedin [rebel] allies who brought down its communist regime in April is creating "a new Somalia ... in the mountains of Central Asia," observes the financial *Saudi Gazette* of Jidda. Interim President Burhanuddin Rabbani, Defense Minister Ahmadshah Massoud, Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostum, and powerful guerrilla chief Gulbuddin Hekmatyar "are out to dismember their country," the paper charges.

Ethnic tensions among the mujahedin—who include Pushtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, and other minorities and who are further split between Sunni and Shiite Muslims—fuel the fighting, reports the newsmagazine *Asiaweek* of Hong Kong. Afghanistan's neighbors are keeping a "wary watch" to protect their interests, the magazine says.

"The Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan want the rights of Afghanistan's northern minorities protected. The Shiite Muslims have many allies in Shiite-majority Iran. Hekmatyar and his Pushtuns are backed by some of their brother Sunnis in Pakistan. India is worried by Rabbani's support for Muslim militants in Kashmir. China frets about the effects of an Islamic revival on its minority Muslims."

Aabha Dixit writes in the independent *Hindustan Times* of New Delhi that the United Nations "must take urgent and coordinated action." Failing to do so, he says, will throw the entire region into turmoil.

WORLD PRESS REVIEW • NOVEMBER 1992



PT 11/8



# AFGHANISTAN FORUM



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**NEW YORK, NY 10021**



#### ABBREVIATIONS USED

|       |  |
|-------|--|
| ACBAR | - Agency Coordinating Bureau for Afghan Relief                 |
| AIG   | - Afghan Interim Government                                    |
| BIA   | - Bakhtar Information Agency                                   |
| CC    | - Central Committee  |
| CSM   | - Christian Science Monitor                                    |
| DYOA  | - Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan                 |
| FRG   | - Federal Republic of Germany                                  |
| GDR   | - German Democratic Republic                                   |
| ICRC  | - Int'l Committee of the Red Cross                             |
| KT    | - Kabul Times  |
| LAT   | - Los Angeles Times  |
| NGO   | - Non-Governmental Organization                                |
| NWFP  | - Northwest Frontier Province                                  |
| NYT   | - New York Times   |
| OIC   | - Organization of Islamic Conference                           |
| PCV   | - Peace Corps Volunteer  |
| PDPA  | - People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan                     |
| PT    | - Pakistan Times   |
| PVO   | - Private Voluntary Organization                               |
| RC    | - Revolutionary Council  |
| RA    | - Republic of Afghanistan                                      |
| SCMP  | - South China Morning Post                                     |
| UNGA  | - United Nations General Assembly                              |
| UNOCA | - United Nations Office of the Commissioner<br>for Afghanistan |
| UNHCR | - United Nations High Commission for Refugees                  |
| WSJ   | - Wall Street Journal  |
| WP    | - Washington Post  |

Line drawings from the 1982 Afghanistan Calendar of the Chicago Afghanistan Relief Committee.

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